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I.BACKGROUND
The Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"), promulgated in 1955, has been one of
the most successful Acts of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL"). Of the forty-nine jurisdictions with arbitration statutes,
thirty-five of these have adopted the UAA and fourteen have based their statutes in
some form upon the UAA.' The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 2 which Congress
passed in 1925, served as the precursor and model of the UAA.'
A primary purpose of the 1955 UAA was to insure the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate and the finality of arbitration awards in the face of often
hostile state law. Like the FAA, the UAA is a succinct procedural framework
governing enforcement of arbitration awards, appointment of arbitrators, method of
arbitration hearing, means of compelling testimony and evidence at the hearing, and
reviewability of arbitral awards.

The intent of the UAA to overcome courts' adverse common-law attitudes has
been accomplished. Today arbitration is a prime mechanism favored by courts and

* Dean and Earl F. Nelson Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO;
Reporter to Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Arbitration Act for the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The author is also a Commissioner of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The author expresses his sincere appreciation to Michele
Homish, Randy Diamond, and Michael Jones for their able research and editing assistance and to
Professor Doug Abrams and Assistant Dean Bob Bailey for their able comments. All of these persons
have made invaluable contributions to this Article.
I. See National Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. St. Laws, Record of Passage of Uniform and ModelActs,
as of September 30, 1999, 1999-2000 REFERENCE BOOK 114.
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
3. The FAA, in turn, was based in large measure upon the New York arbitration statute, which was
passed in 1920 and was the first modem, comprehensive law in the United States dealing with
commercial arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § I; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 1998).
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parties to resolve disputes in many areas of the law.' This growth in arbitration
caused NCCUSL to appoint a Study Committee in 1994 to determine whether the
UAA should be revised. In 1996, the Study Committee concluded that changes were
necessary in a number of areas because of the increased use of arbitration, the greater
complexity of many disputes submitted to arbitration, and intervening developments
in the arbitration law. That same year NCCUSL appointed a Drafting Committee to
revise the UAA.
The first meeting of the Drafting Committee was in May of 1997. A total of
eight meetings from 1997 to 2000' were attended (1) by liaisons of American Bar
Association committees, including the Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution
of the Section of Litigation, the Section of Dispute Resolution, the Torts and
Insurance Practice Section, and the Senior Lawyers Division; (2) by many arbitration
organizations, including the American Arbitration Association, JAMS, CPR, and the
National Arbitration Forum; and (3) by observers from interested groups, including
securities, construction, labor-management relations, consumers, insurance, and
domestic relations.
The Drafting Committee presented the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act7
("RUAA") 6 to NCCUSL for a final reading at its annual meeting in August 2000.
NCCUSL unanimously passed RUAA on August 3, 2000.8
The Drafting Committee sought to achieve a number of goals in the RUAA.
Some critics complain that arbitration, as it evolves, becomes more like litigation,
but arbitrators decide many more involved and difficult issues than when the UAA
was promulgated more than forty-five years ago. The Drafting Committee attempted
to maintain the UAA's relatively basic format and the statute's recognition that many
users of the arbitration process are non-attorneys or seek to resolve relatively minor
disputes; at the same time, however, the Drafting Committee incorporated provisions
that acknowledge arbitration as a means for settling extremely complicated matters.
In the RUAA, the Drafting Committee modernized outdated UAA provisions, added
entirely new sections, resolved issues ambiguous or unanswered under the old
statute, and codified case law developments.
The RUAA includes provisions on such matters as utilizing new means of
electronic communications in arbitration; 9 whether courts or arbitrators decide
arbitrability;'0 provisional remedies;" arbitrator disclosure of interests and

4. See infra notes 24-28.
5. For the drafts of revisions to the Uniform Arbitration Act that the Drafting Committee considered
at these eight meetings, see 2000 Annual Meeting Draft; March 2000 Draft; February2000 Draft;
October 1999 Draft; February 19, 1999 Draft; October 9, 1998 Draft; Revised Tentative Draft #2,
March. 20. 1998; Revised Tentative Draft #1. October 31. 1997, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ulc frame.htm.
6. The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("R.U.A.A.") appears in Appendix A. The RUAA with
Official Comments may be found at 2000 Styled Act with Comments. Dec. 13, 2000, athttp://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc/uarba/arb103 1.htm.
7. See 2000 Annual Meeting Draft, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm.
8. The vote of the delegations of NCCUSL, which is made up of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, was 50-0 with one state (Alabama) abstaining and two
states (Michigan and Rhode Island) not voting.
9. See R.U.A.A. §§ 1(6), 30 (2000).
10. Id.§6.

II. Id.§§ 8, 18.
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relationships; 2 immunity of arbitrators and arbitration organizations; 3 the
arbitrator's power to order prehearing conferences and decide dispositive motions; 4
discovery;" court enforcement of pre-award rulings by arbitrators;16 punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and other remedies; 7 court awards of attorney's fees to
arbitrators, arbitration organizations and prevailing parties in litigation involving an
arbitration matter;"8 which sections of the RUAA are waivable;'9 and a phased-in
effective date for when the RUAA will apply to all arbitration agreements.2 °
The Drafting Committee sought to accomplish three main goals in the RUAA 21:
1. Because arbitration is at heart a consensual process, the RUAA gives party
autonomy primary consideration, provided the arbitration agreement conforms to
basic notions of fundamental fairness. In many instances the RUAA acts as a default
statute applicable only in the absence of the parties' agreement.22 This approach
allows the parties to shape their own arbitration mechanism in an effort to insure that
it is best suited to their particular type of transaction.
2. Many parties choose arbitration because of its relative speed, lower cost, and
greater efficiency. The RUAA intends to give these factors sufficient weight
whenever possible.
3. In most cases, parties intend the arbitrators' decisions to be final with little
or no court involvement unless there is clear unfairness or denial of justice. The
RUAA recognizes this contractual nature of arbitration by limiting the grounds on
which a court may review an arbitrator's award.
From the outset of the Drafting Committee's deliberations, two issues came to
the fore: federal preemption and adhesion contracts.23 The complexity of both
matters presented substantial challenges to the Drafting Committee. The Drafting
Committee needed to reach early agreement on an approach to preemption and
adhesion, which affect so many areas covered by state arbitration law.
A. Preemption
In the past two decades, the United States Supreme Court has developed a strong
pro-arbitration stance under the FAA concerning the enforceability of arbitration
clauses that override contrary state law.24 Although the FAA itself does not confer

12. id.§ 12.
13. Id. § 14.

14. Id. § 15.
15. Id.§ 17.
16. Id. § 18.
17. Id.§ 21.
18. Id. §§ 14, 25.
19. Id.§4.
20. Id.§§ 3,31,32,33.
21. See Preface to 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6.
22. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supranote 6, at Official Comment I to R.U.A.A. § 4.
23. See Memorandum Sept. 29, 1998 (Contracts of Adhesion and Unconscionability); Policy
Statement. supra note 6.
24. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984);
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts, the FAA's reach is broad, covering all
transactions affecting interstate commerce.25 This coverage creates a wide sphere in
which the FAA operates, and the Supreme Court has held that it usually preempts
state law that runs contrary to the federal statute's pro-arbitration policies.2 6
However, state arbitration statutes are still effective and apply in many arbitration
cases, especially where parties choose to apply a particular jurisdiction's arbitration
law in their agreements and where these state arbitration laws are not inimical to the
FAA's pro-arbitration position developed by the Supreme Court.27

25. See. e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 273-74 (applying FAA to fullest extent allowable
under Interstate Commerce Clause); Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that although FAA does not create federal jurisdiction where matter involves claim of violation
ofsecurities laws involving interstate commerce, FAA applies); Specialty Healthcare Mgmt. v. St. Mary
Parish Hosp., 220 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that because FAA does not create federal
jurisdiction, confirmation of arbitration award requires an independent basis for jurisdiction including
contracts evidencing transactions involving interstate commerce); Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net, 101
Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (deciding that whether insured was required to arbitrate
claim of benefit coverage with health maintenance organization was determined by FAA because plan
involved interstate commerce); Carpenter v. Brooks, 534 S.E.2d 641,645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that because brokerage agreement involved interstate commerce, FAA and not UAA applies to investors'
claims); In re Alamo Lumber Co., 23 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that FAA
applies to employment contracts that relate to interstate commerce).
26. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1; Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. 841
F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988); Creative Tile Mkt. v. SICIS Int'l, S.r.L., 922 F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1996);
Thompson v. Skipper Real Estate Co., 729 So. 2d 287 (Ala. 1999); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842
S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992).
27. See. e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (noting that
intent of the contracting parties determines whether state law disallowing punitive damages applies to
arbitration); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989) (concluding that Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt California law that permits court
to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation involving third parties not bound by arbitration
agreement where parties agreed in contract to abide by state rules of arbitration); International
Technologies Integration, Inc. v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 66 F. Supp. 2d 3, 10 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (deciding that where parties agreed to arbitrate disputes in accordance with Virginia law,
Virginia's arbitration law, not Federal Arbitration Act, governed determinations of validity of arbitration
award); Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that limitations
period in Connecticut's law which was applicable according to the arbitration agreement was not
preempted by FAA); Bank v. International Bus. Machs. Corp. 915 F.Supp. 491 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating
that Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act, rather than FAA, applied to arbitration of dispute over
purchase of mortgage note where partnership agreement called for use of Massachusetts law in
determining rights and obligations of parties); Swan v. American Family Mut. Ins., 8 P.3d 546, 548
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (applying state arbitration statute to determine whether request to arbitrators to
modify award tolls time limits for filing a court action); Hawrelak v. Marine Bank, Springfield, 735
N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (I1. App. Ct. 2000) (applying state Uniform Arbitration Act to determine validity
of arbitration award); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. George Hyman Constr., 715 N.E.2d 749, 755 (111.
App. Ct. 1999) (concluding that a clause in a construction contract which generally chose state law over
federal law applied to arbitration of the dispute); Albright v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 571 N.E.2d 1329,
1332-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that state arbitration law is not preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act in action on claim under securities laws and RICO where the parties agree that their
arbitration agreement will be governed by state law); Group Health Plan, Inc. v. BJC Health Sys., Inc.,
30 S.W.3d 198, 202 (E.D. Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Missouri arbitration statute rather than FAA
to determine propriety of subpoena for confidential information); JJ's Mae, Inc. v. H.Warshow & Sons,
No. 2373N, 2000 WL 1725502, *1 (N.Y.A.D. Nov. 21, 2000) (determining that although the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts inconsistent State law as to an arbitration agreement's enforceability, it
preempts only those provisions of state law that actually conflict with provisions of the Federal statute
and does not preempt general principles of state contract law as rules of decision on whether the parties
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The preemption doctrine also requires that the enforceability of arbitration
agreements under state law must be determined by the same standards applied to
other contracts. Thus, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute mandating that
arbitration agreements be in a format not required of other contracts, holding that the
state law failed to place agreements to arbitrate on "equal footing" with other
contracts.2 8 Treating arbitration agreements differently from other contracts under
state law places a burden on such agreements that the Court has found inconsistent
with fostering arbitration as a dispute-resolution mechanism.
Because the policies of most states, in particular those which have adopted the
UAA, support the arbitration process, state law should apply where parties
specifically choose state arbitration statutes as the means to resolve disputes. Like
the FAA, these state arbitration statutes foster arbitration by making agreements to
arbitrate broadly enforceable. 9 As a result, courts have decided numerous cases
under the UAA30 and should continue to do so with state adoptions of the RUAA.
However, the strong policy of federal preemption under the FAA acted as a
backdrop to all the discussions of the Drafting Committee while it deliberated the
RUAA. To avoid federal preemption problems for the RUAA, the Drafting
Committee worked diligently to write provisions consistent with the FAA's proarbitration policy and not to treat law regarding state arbitration statutes different
from the general state law of contracts.

have entered into an agreement to arbitrate); Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 291,296
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (deciding validity of forum-selection clause in arbitration agreement between U.S.
and foreign corporation under Texas state law); In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding that Texas arbitration statute rather than FAA applied to malpractice claim by client against
attorney).
28. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. 681. See also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79
(2000) (concluding that in light of the FAA's purpose of putting arbitration clauses on equal footing with
other contracts, claimant could not escape the provisions of the contract merely because the agreement
is silent as to arbitration costs; rather the party seeking to overcome a valid arbitration agreement on the
grounds that it is overly expensive bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring the costs);
Stout v. J. D. Byrider, 228 F. 3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that in claim based on fraud and
violation of state sales protection act that FAA preempts inconsistent state law); Warren-Guthrie, 101
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265 (holding that statute allowing a state court to disregard an arbitration clause, and
order joinder of all parties in a single action or proceeding, due to the possibility of inconsistent rulings,
does not establish a defense generally applicable to contracts, but is specifically limited to arbitration
clauses, and thus, statute is inconsistent with, and is preempted, by Federal Arbitration Act where statute
is used to avoid or delay arbitration of dispute over a contract involving interstate commerce that is
governed by FAA).
29. Compare R.U.A.A. § 6(a) and U.A.A. § I with 9 U.S.C. § 2.
30. See supra note 27. See also Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court
1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1996) (discussing reach of the federal
preemption doctrine); Benjamin K. Byrd et al., Project, Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1998 J.DisP. RESOL. 233; Jamie K. Hunt et al., Project, Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 1999 J.DISP. RESOL. 219.
31. The issue of federal preemption and the RUAA is taken up in more detail in this symposium in
Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, 2001 J.DISP. RESOL. 67.
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B. Adhesion and Consumer Issues
Encouraged by recent Supreme Court and federal appellate court opinions
broadening federal arbitration law under the FAA,32 many businesses have
incorporated arbitration provisions in customer, employment, and franchise contracts
on this issue.33 Binding arbitration clauses are now a common feature of agreements
involving employment, consumer transactions, banking, credit cards, finances,
securities, health care, insurance, franchise and telecommunication.34 Such
agreements often do not involve arm's-length negotiation but consist of terms
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis-a classic indicium of a contract of adhesion.
Boilerplate arbitration provisions raise serious fairness concerns because they replace
a person's right to sue in court with a private adjudication system of which many
individuals, such as consumers or employees, may be unaware until a dispute arises.

32. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 681-82 (overruling a state law mandating special notice
requirements for arbitration agreements); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 270 (applying FAA broadly
under Interstate Commerce Clause); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991)
(holding that arbitration provision in individual employment agreement applies to claims that fall under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989) (requiring arbitration of claim under federal securities law);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (upholding the arbitration of
actions filed under federal securities and RICO laws); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985) (stating a strong presumption favoring the arbitrability of
parties' disputes); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12 (finding that FAA preempts inconsistent state law
and applies in both federal and state arbitration actions); Moses H. Cone Mem 'lHosp.,460U.S. at 24-25
(holding that law under the FAA favors arbitration and any doubts in construing a contract should be in
favor of arbitration); Amijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995) (reiterating
federal policy favoring the arbitrability of disputes); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
Union 103 v. Indiana Constr. Corp., 13 F.3d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a party contesting
the submission of the claim to arbitration must clearly show that the presumption of arbitrability does
not apply); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1 st Cir. 1989) (holding that intent
of FAA is to promote the use of arbitration); Cohen, 841 F.2d at 288 (determining that courts should
vigorously enforce arbitration agreements). See also Hayford, supra note 30.
33. See Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action. Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 7-15 (2000) (discussing the prevalence of binding
arbitration provisions in various contracts, as well as the implications of those provisions); Samuel
Estreicher & San S. Saulson, Bypass Unions to Negotiate Individual Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory
Discrimination Claims, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 2000, at l(stating that Brown & Root/Halliburton, Philip
Morris, Cigna, Northrup, Salomon/Smith Barney and International Paper all utilize mandatory arbitration
clauses); Stephanie Armour, Mandatory Arbitration: A Pill Many are Forced to Swallow, U.S.A.
TODAY, July 9, 1998 at IA (stating that companies such as Circuit City, Travelers Group, Hooters of
America, the Olive Garden and Red Lobster use mandatory arbitration clauses); Lisa Girion, Arbitration
Hearings Expected to Rise in Wake of Court Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2000 at CI (stating that
"[more than a quarter of California companies require employees to sign arbitration agreements").
34. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995);
Christopher R. Drahozal. "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript
on file with author); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 33 (1997); Jean R.
Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
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Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to find arbitration agreements
unconscionable, even in adhesion situations." However, some recent decisions have
indicated a greater willingness to scrutinize more closely the equity and
enforceability of arbitration agreements, particularly in adhesion situations involving
employees and consumers.36 There also has been a growing trend by arbitration
organizations and broad-based groups of persons involved in employment,
consumer, and health-care arbitration to create consensual, fundamental due-process
standards to insure the fairness of arbitration in these areas."
The Drafting Committee was very concerned with arbitration agreements in
adhesion contracts, but it determined to leave this issue to developing law rather than
to propose special provisions for consumers, employees, franchisees, or others in a
state arbitration statute. A primary reason for this decision was to avoid the
significant FAA preemption problems raised by singling out some arbitration
agreements for particular treatment different from other contract law.38 The
Drafting Committee concluded that Congress may best develop appropriate statutory
provisions for arbitration in adhesion contexts by amending the FAA.
Additionally, the Drafting Committee believed that the doctrine of
unconscionability principally reflects the substantive law of contracts. State statutes
dealing with relationships involving consumers, employees, franchisees, and others
may better handle these adhesion situations and run less risk of preemption.
However, if an arbitration agreement or its application is contrary to general contract
law requirements, such as the requirement that terms not be so procedurally and
substantively overbearing as to be unconscionable, then section 6(a) of the RUAA 3 9

35. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. 79; We Care Hair Dev., Inc. v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir.
1999); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of
Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992); Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 862 P.2d 26 (Mont.
1 93); Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996);
II IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 19.3 (1994) [hereinafter "MACNEIL TREATISE"];
Schwartz, supra note 34; Stephen J.Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates.
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996); Julian J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (or
Lack Thereof): Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1572 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet
Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998); Broemmer, 840 P.2d 1013; Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak
Houses Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Arnold v. United Co. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d
854 (W. Va. 1998).
37. See Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out ofthe
Employment Relationship; National Academy of Arbitrators, Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory
Claims under Employer-Promulgated Systems (May 21, 1997); National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee, Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes (1998); Due
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Health Care Disputes (1998).
38. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 684 (enforcing an arbitration agreement under the FAA,
preempting a Montana statute which required that "[niotice that a contract is subject to arbitration...
shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract").
39. An arbitration agreement is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists
at law or in equity for the revocation of contract." R.U.A.A. § 6(a). See also 2000 Styled Act with
Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 7 to R.U.A.A. § 6. The FAA has a similar provision that
an arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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would invalidate the arbitration provision, especially in light of rapidly developing
case law.4°
Section 4 of the RUAA makes a number of provisions nonwaivable. 4' A key
reason why the Drafting Committee included section 4 was to address the adhesion
situation and to put some limits on the one-sidedness of arbitration agreements. 42
For instance, section 4 requires a party, before a dispute arises, to waive the right to
representation by an attorney at an arbitration proceeding."' This section has specific
limits on a party's ability to unreasonably restrict notice of the initiation of an
arbitration proceeding, to unreasonably prevent disclosure by a neutral arbitrator, to
limit arbitrators' subpoena power, or to prevent applications to a court to aid the
arbitration process." Even the general provision in section 4(a) that parties may
waive or vary the RUAA's effects is subject to the condition that waiver or variance
is appropriate only "to the extent permitted by law."45 This phrase seeks to
underscore the principle that in adhesion situations, parties may not bind others to
unconscionable arbitration provisions. 46
Because of substantial concerns over federal preemption and the difficulty of
tailoring an appropriate statutory standard for unconscionability in the myriad of
adhesion circumstances, the RUAA does not have a specific section on adhesion and
unconscionability. However, a number of provisions, such as section 6(a) and
section 4, indirectly address these issues and prohibit unconscionable arbitration
clauses. Moreover, the Official Comments make clear that courts should refuse to
enforce unconscionable arbitration agreements, especially in adhesion situations.47

II. NEW PROVISIONS
The RUAA includes a number of new concepts not addressed in the UAA.
Because it has been almost fifty years since the UAA has been amended and
seventy-five years since major changes were last made to the FAA, the Drafting
Committee attempted not only to update the uniform arbitration statute to reflect
modem practice, but also to address issues that are likely to arise as arbitration
continues to develop as a major source of resolving disputes.

40. See supra note 36.
41. R.U.A.A. § 4.

42. The issue of adhesion and the RUAA is analyzed in this symposium in Stephen J. Ware, Paying
The Priceof Process: JudicialRegulation of Consumer ArbitrationAgreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL.
89.
43. R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(4). Because of the longstanding practice in the field of labor-management
arbitration to allow arbitration agreements to exclude attorneys, an exception was made for this type of
arbitration. However, such agreements rarely involve an adhesion situation because of the relatively
equal bargaining power of labor organizations and employers. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments,
supra note 6, at Official Comment 4(c) to R.U.A.A. § 4.
44. R.U.A.A. § 4(b), (c).
45. Id. § 4(a).
46. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6,at Official Comment 3 to R.U.A.A.
§4.
47. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 7 to R.U.A.A.

§ 6.
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A. ElectronicArbitration (E-arbitration)
The UAA and the FAA were enacted at times when commerce was conducted
primarily through paper transactions. For instance, both arbitration statutes require
'
The UAA also
that an arbitration agreement is enforceable only if it is "written."48
'49
requires a "hearing
and mandates that an arbitrator's award be "in writing and
signed."50 Understandably, the drafters of these statutes did not foresee the
revolutionary changes that have occurred in commercial transactions in the age of
computer technology and electronic and digital communications.
In this time of e-commerce, businesses and consumers will conduct more and
more transactions by electronic means, and this changed technology will transform
the manner in which parties arbitrate disputes that arise from such transactions. For
instance, at least one arbitration provider, the National Arbitration Forum, already
has rules for on-line arbitration. The RUAA takes account of this shift in business
operations in a number of ways and seeks to accommodate even electronic
arbitration (e-arbitration).
The RUAA changes the requirement that an arbitration agreement be in
writing5" to one that the accord be contained in a "record." The term "record" is
defined to mean not only a written document in a "tangible medium," but also
"information ...that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form."53 Thus, the RUAA enforces arbitration agreements in electronic
documents.
Concerning the UAA requirement that the arbitrator's award be "in writing and
signed,"s the RUAA also allows the award to be a "record," i.e., in electronic
format. As to the signature requirement, the RUAA states that the arbitrator's award
"must be signed or otherwise authenticated." 5 The Comments make clear that an
arbitrator may execute an award by e-signature, which means "by attaching to or
logically associating with the record, an electronic sound, symbol or process with the
intent to sign the record. 5 6 This language was adopted from the Electronic

48. U.A.A. § 1; 9 U.S.C. § 2.
49. Id. § 5.

50. Id.§ 8(a).

51.

NAT'L ARB. FORUM CODE OF PRO. RULES.
52. In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation, No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill., May
8, 2000), demonstrates the problem courts face in interpreting the term "written" in light of modem
documents in electronic format. In that case the court was faced with the validity of an electronic
licensing agreement containing an arbitration clause, which the user must accept by clicking a button
on a computer before downloading the licensor's software. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that such
an arbitration clause is not a "written" agreement within the meaning of section 2 of the FAA, the court
looked at definitions of the term "written" in effect at the time the FAA was passed in 1925. There were
indications in some of these dictionaries that "written" could mean stored in a medium other than
"paper." The court concluded that the electronic arbitration agreement fit the 1925 definition of
"written" because the document was easily printable and storable. The RUAA eliminates the need for
such strained reasoning as the court went through in RealNetworks.
53. R.U.A.A. § 1(6).
54. U.A.A. § 8(a).
55. R.U.A.A. § 19(a).
56. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment I to R.U.A.A. § 19.
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Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 7 which the Drafting Committee
specifically incorporated into the RUAA.55 The reason for incorporating this federal
statute is to insure that the RUAA conforms to the federal legislation that allows a
state law to use e-signatures5 9 As a result, the RUAA permits an arbitrator to submit
a valid on-line arbitration award with an electronic signature.
The only provision in the RUAA that would require a paper transaction is
section 9 regarding the initiation of arbitration. This new provision requires formal
notice before a party commences an arbitration.60 Section 9(a) states that such notice
be sent "by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested and obtained, or by
service as authorized for the commencement of a civil action. ''61 These methods of
notice, either by certified or registered mail or by service as in a civil lawsuit, would
require written documents. The Drafting Committee included section 9 to insure that
parties would know when a person commenced an arbitration proceeding against
them. The Drafting Committee specifically rejected suggestions that parties could
send this initial notice by electronic means such as fax or electronic mail because the
members were concerned that such electronic communications do not always reach
the affected party or give notice on their own that a matter may involve important
rights in an adjudication.
However, section 9 is a default provision and parties may give an initial notice
of arbitration not only formally by registered or certified mail or by service of
process, but also "in the agreed manner between the parties. 62 Many arbitration
organizations allow parties to initiate arbitration by regular mail without registered
mail or service as in a civil action.63 Particularly in light of the increase in ecommerce, parties may decide to arbitrate disputes arising between them and to
provide notice of the initiation of the arbitration process through electronic means.
If electronic notification comports with section 4(b)(2), which allows the parties to
agree to any means of giving notice provided there are no unreasonable restrictions,"

57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001, 7002.
58. See R.U.A.A. § 30.
59. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment I to R.U.A.A.

§ 30.
60. RUAA § 9(a) requires a person initiating an arbitration proceeding to "describe the nature of the
controversy and the remedy sought" in the notice, which must be in a "record." See R.U.A.A. § 1(6).
This provision is intended to insure that parties give sufficient notice in accord with due process
requirements of the dispute and remedy sought but recognizes that the notice is not a formal, legal
pleading. Non-attorneys often draft such notices. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6,
at Official Comment 5 to R.U.A.A. § 9. Section 23(a)(6) allows a court to vacate an arbitral award when
a party fails to give proper notice of initiation but only if the other party has made a timely objection and
proves substantial prejudice as a result of the lack of notice. See R.U.A.A. §§ 9(b), 23(a)(6).
61. R.U.A.A. § 9(a). The term "obtained" means that the receipt was returned to the sender regardless
of whether the recipient signed the receipt. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supranote 6, at Official
Comment 3 to R.U.A.A. § 9.
62. R.U.A.A. § 9(a)..
63. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS'N, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES,
R. 4(b)(i)(2); CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF
BUSINESS DISPUTES, R. 2.1; NAT'L ARB. FORUM CODE OF PRO. R. 6(B); NAT'L ASS'N OF SECURITIES
DEALERS CODE OF ARB. PROCEDURE, Part 1, sec. 25(a); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE ARB. RULES, R.

612(b).
64. R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(2).
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this more informal method of giving electronic notice would be appropriate under
section 9.
Finally, the "hearing" requirement in section 15(d) should not be an impediment
to those who desire to conduct an on-line, e-arbitration proceeding. The UAA
allowed vacatur of an award when the arbitrator's refusal to "hear" evidence material
to the controversy substantially prejudiced the rights of a party. 65 Even under the
UAA, courts did not require that the arbitrator physically listen to testimony to
render a valid award.' Nevertheless, the RUAA's vacatur section has restated the
requirement that the arbitrator must "consider" such material evidence. 67 This
change was intended to insure that an arbitrator need not listen to live testimony
before making a determination. Moreover, RUAA section 15(b), allowing for
summary disposition, makes clear that an arbitrator may determine a case based
solely on documentation, including information submitted to the arbitrator in an
electronic format. If an arbitrator decides to hold a hearing, the use of video
communications under today's technology should satisfy any rights to a hearing,
presentation of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses required by section
15.68 Also, because section 15 is a waivable provision,69 the parties may agree not
to hold a live hearing before the arbitrator, but instead to submit videotape
presentations of witnesses' testimony or simply to provide only documents to the
arbitrator.
If the parties so desire, they should be able to conduct an e-arbitration
proceeding-from commencement, through hearing and to award-by electronic,
digital and other modem means of communication. These provisions allowing for
e-arbitration indicate the Drafting Committee's modernization of the RUAA to meet
the challenges of a new century.
B. Consolidation
Section 10 is a new provision allowing courts to consolidate arbitration
proceedings in appropriate circumstances.' It is one of the RUAA's major changes,
not only because the UAA had no consolidation provision but also because section
10's approach is contrary to FAA holdings on consolidation. Section 10 seeks to
address the situation where persons are parties to multiple contracts with similar
arbitration agreements and where their disputes concern essentially the same matter.
Such situations are particularly common in construction, insurance, maritime, and
consumer transactions. 7 ' For instance, typically a manufacturer that sells computers

65. U.AA. § 12(a)(4).
66. See, e.g., Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1096, 1105 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (concluding that an arbitrator need not "hear" evidence in the audible sense to rule on adjudicative
motions but that affidavits would suffice because "[I]egally speaking the admission ofevidence is to hear
it").
67. R.U.A.A. § 23(a)(3).
68. Id. §§ 15(d), 23(a)(3).
69. See id. § 4(a).
70. Id. § 10.
71. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable
Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 481-82 (1987).
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either over the Internet or by mail will include an arbitration clause in the sales
agreement with customers.7" If a defect occurs in the computer, thousands of
purchasers may have identical claims and be bound by the same arbitration provision
with the manufacturer but in separate sales agreements. Without a means to
consolidate these claims in a single proceeding, it is likely that common issues of law
or fact will be resolved in multiple fora. Such a result substantially increases the
overall expense of resolving the conflict and invites inconsistent and conflicting
outcomes.73
The UAA, the FAA, and most state arbitration statutes 74 do not specifically
address consolidation of arbitration proceedings. Some state courts have interpreted
their arbitration statutes to grant courts authority to order consolidation in
appropriate circumstances to promote adjudicative efficiency and avoid
contradictory holdings, 75 but other courts have refused to order consolidation of
76
separate arbitrations without a specific agreement that provides for consolidation.
The present case law under the FAA follows this latter line of judicial decisions
denying consolidation where an arbitration agreement is silent on the matter, on the
ground that consolidation could infringe party autonomy.77

72. See. e.g., Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147,1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitration agreement,
sent in box containing computer sold over the telephone to a consumer and which stated that its terms
governed the sale unless computer was returned within 30 days, was binding on buyer who did not return
computer); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 246 A.D.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding
arbitration clause of computer manufacturer in dispute with consumer is unconscionable because it
required arbitration in a distant locale for the consumer and imposed on consumer high administrative
costs of arbitration); Jean R. Stemlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding
Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 8.
73. See MACNEIL TREATISE, supra note 35, at Ill § 33.3.2.
74. A growing number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes allowing courts to address multiparty
conflict through consolidation of proceedings or joinder of parties even in the absence of specific
contractual provisions authorizing such procedures. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1281.3 (West 1997)
(consolidation); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-6 (1996) (consolidation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2A
(West 1997) (consolidation);N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-23A-3 (West 1997) (consolidation); S.C. CODEANN.
§ 15-48-60 (1996) (joinder); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31 a-9 (1996) (joinder).
75. See New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1 st Cir. 1988); Litton Bionetics,
Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208 (Md. 1981); Grover-Diamond Assoc. v. American Arbitration
Ass'n, 211 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. 1973); Exber v. Sletten Constr. Co., 558 P.2d 517 (Nev. 1976); County
of Sullivan v. Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 72 (N.Y. 1977); Plaza Dev. Serv. v. Joe Harden
Builder, Inc., 365 S.E.2d 231 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988); Blue Cross of Calif. v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. App.
4th 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Polshek v. Bergen County Iron Works, 362 A.2d 63 (N. J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1976).
76. See, e.g., Stop & Shop Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 304 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. 1973); Balfour, Guthrie
& Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 607 P.2d 856 (Wash. 1980); J. Brodie & Son, v. George A. FullerCo.,
167 N.W.2d 886 (Mich. App. C. 1969).
77. See generally Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prod. Co., 189 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding that consolidation is not appropriate under the FAA unless the arbitration agreement specifically
allows for consolidation); Government of the United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that "a district court cannot order consolidation of arbitration proceedings arising from
separate agreements to arbitrate absent the parties' agreement to allow such consolidation"); Champ v.
Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the Second, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held that absent an express provision in the agreement a
district court may not require consolidation, and adopting that standard as well); American Centennial
Ins. v. National Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991 ) (stating that the district court does not have
power to consolidate when the agreement is silent on the matter); Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900
F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that when an arbitration agreement is silent as to consolidation,
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The Drafting Committee decided to empower courts in appropriate instances to
order consolidation of arbitration cases. The Drafting Committee believed that
because efficiency is a primary reason many parties enter into arbitration
agreements, consolidation would encourage better use of the arbitration mechanism.
The Drafting Committee also wanted to insure that parties with similar claims do not
receive inconsistent determinations, an outcome which lessens participants' faith in
the adjudicative process. Moreover, it is likely in many instances that when they
enter into the agreement, one or more of the parties, often the non-drafting parties,
do not consider the possible effects of the arbitration clause on multiparty disputes.
Only when a dispute arises do most persons seriously consider the need to resolve
multiple claims involving the same or similar matters in a single proceeding. The
party that believes consolidation is not in its best interest will almost certainly object,
making the chances of consolidation remote. Moreover, if the parties had litigated,
rather than arbitrated their claims, a court invariably would have ordered the claims
consolidated, joined or resolved in a class-action proceeding.78 Indeed, there is
empirical evidence that persons involved in multiple-party arbitrations
overwhelmingly prefer that courts have the power to determine whether similar
claims should be consolidated.79 This is strong indication that consolidation not only
benefits the process of deciding arbitral disputes more effectively, but also follows
the likely intent of those who agreed to arbitration.
Section 10 is a default provision, leaving the parties free to determine in their
arbitration agreements whether to allow consolidation.80 By establishing a rule that
in the absence of an agreement prohibiting consolidation, courts may order joinder,
section 10 encourages parties to arbitration provisions to expressly address
consolidation in their agreements; such an outcome enhances the probability that all
parties will be on notice regarding whether a contract provides for consolidation.
Section 10 authorizes courts, not arbitrators, to order consolidation."' The
section carefully defines the criteria to conform as much as possible to the likely
intent of the contracting parties and to insure fairness to all involved. Courts have
discretion to order consolidation if (1) there is a multiparty situation where all

a district court has no power to order consolidation); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989) (questioning only whether consolidation has been expressly
authorized by the parties); Ilyundai Am., Inc. v. Meissner & Wurst GMBH & Co.-U.S. Operations, 26
F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (refusing to consolidate, noting that the United States Court
of Appeals has refused to consolidate arbitration insimilar circumstances); MACNEIL TREATISE, supra
note 35, at III § 33.3.
78. FEi). R.Civ. P. 18-20 (joinder); 23 (class actions); 42 (consolidation).
79. In a survey of arbitrators in construction cases where there are usually multiple parties that have
the same basic claim against an owner, contractor, subcontractor, or architect, 83% favored consolidated
arbitrations involving all affected parties. See Dean B.Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A
Suirve,'y
of ('onstruction Arbitrators, 23 IIOFSTRA I. REV. 137, 165-67 (1994). A similar survey of
members of the ABA Forum on the Construction Industry found that 83% of nearly 1,000 responding
practitioners also favored consolidation of arbitrations involving multiparty disputes. See Dean B.
Thomson, The Forni s Survey on the Current and ProposedAIA A201 Dispute Resolution Provisions,
16 CONSTRUCTION LAW._ July, 1996, at 3,5.

80. See R.J.A.A. §§ 4(a), 10(c).
81. 1l § 10(a).
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involved have arbitration agreements, 2 (2) the claims arise out of essentially the
same or related transactions," (3) common issues of law or fact create the possibility
of conflicting decisions if the cases were arbitrated in separate proceedings, 4 and (4)
the prejudice from failure to consolidate is not outweighed by delay or prejudice to
parties opposing consolidation."3 Moreover, the court may decide to consolidate
some of the claims and allow others to be resolved in separate arbitration
proceedings if that would be a more appropriate result.8 6 However, a court is
precluded from ordering consolidation of arbitral proceedings where the parties'
arbitration agreement prohibits consolidation."1
The four criteria established in section 10(a) seek to allow a court sufficient
discretion to ascertain the parties' legitimate expectations about whether they
intended consolidated arbitration proceedings. A court under section 10(a)(4) should
carefully balance the interests of all parties by determining whether the prejudice
from denying a motion to consolidate is outweighed by the prejudice, delay, or
hardship to the party opposing arbitration.88
For instance, absent express
prohibitions on consolidation, a number of decisions have recognized the right of
parties to prove that consolidation would undermine their intent to arbitrate all
claims separately, especially when the procedures for selecting arbitrators differ
significantly. 9 However, other decisions have taken a more liberal view that a court
should not require a party requesting consolidation to demonstrate that the parties
clearly meant such a result but should apply a standard of whether it is more likely
than not that the parties intended consolidation." This latter position is the approach
of section 10(a)(4). Thus, where imposition on contractual expectations will not be
substantial, a court should order consolidation. 9'

82. Id. § 10(a)(I ). The language in section l0(a)(1) regarding "separate agreements to arbitrate" and
"separate arbitration proceedings" is intended to cover arbitration among both principals and third-party
beneficiaries of either the same arbitration agreement or separate agreements, such as guarantees, which
incorporate the arbitration provisions by reference in the underlying contract. See. e.g., Compania
Espanola de Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping Co., 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975). But see United Kingdom,
988 F.2d 68.
83. R.U.A.A. § 10(a)(2).
84. Id. § 10(a)(3).
85. Id. § 10(a)(4).
86. Id. § l0(b).
87. Id. § 10(c).
88. Id. § 10(a)(4).
89. See Continental Energy Assoc. v. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., 596 N.Y.S.2d 416, 467 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that denial of consolidation is not an abuse of discretion where parties' two
arbitration agreements differed substantially with respect to procedures for selecting arbitrators and
manner in which award was to be rendered); Stewart Tenants Corp. v. Diesel Constr. Co., 229 N.Y.S.2d
204, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (refusing to consolidate arbitrations where one agreement required
American Arbitration Association tribunal, other called for arbitrator to be appointee ofpresident of real
estate board).
90. Connecticut Gen'I Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 210 F.3d 771,773 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that a standard of whether it is more likely than not that parties intended consolidation,
rather than adopting astandard requiring parties to show a clear intent to consolidate, is more appropriate
because the same considerations of adjudicative economy that argue in favor of consolidating closely
related court cases argue for consolidating closely related arbitrations).
91. The example, the Comment to section 10, involves one agreement requiring arbitration in St. Paul,
Minnesota, and the other in the adjoining city of Minneapolis. Normally courts should not consider
consolidated hearings in either city to violate a substantial right of the parties. See 2000 Styled Act with
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Section 10(a)(4) also requires courts determining whether to grant consolidation
to consider prejudice due to alleged "undue delay" or "hardship. 92 Such undue
delay or hardship might result where, for instance, one or more separate arbitration
proceedings have already progressed to the hearing stage before a party moves to
consolidate. However, the decisions indicate that the mere desire to have one's
dispute heard in a separate arbitration proceeding is not sufficient to prevent
consolidation. 93
Under section 28, a party cannot appeal a lower court order either granting or
denying a motion to consolidate under section 10. This approach is consistent with
the policy behind section 28, which does not allow parties to appeal lower court
orders that result in delaying the arbitration process.95 Whether a court grants or
denies a motion to consolidate, the arbitrations likely will continue-either
separately or in a consolidated proceeding-and to allow an appeal of the lower
court order would detain the arbitration process.
Section 10 does not address the hotly debated issue of class-action arbitrations.96
Consolidation enables parties who have filed claims against another to combine their
disputes into a single arbitration proceeding; in a class-action arbitration, one or
more parties bring an action pressing not only their own claims but also those of
unrepresented persons who are similarly situated but who have not filed a challenge
to the dispute. 97 Section 10(c) recognizes that consolidation of a party's claims
should not be ordered in contravention of provisions in arbitration agreements

Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 3 to R.U.A.A. § 10.
92. R.U.A.A. § 10(a)(4).
93. Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship Corp. of Monrovia, 26 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (NY. Ct. App. 1970). See
also MACNEIL TREATISE, supra note 35, at III
§ 33.3.2 (citing cases in which consolidation was ordered
despite allegations that arbitrators might be confused because of the increased complexity of
consolidated arbitration or that consolidation would impose additional economic burdens on the party
opposing it).
94. R.U.A.A. § 28.
95. Cook v. Erbey, 207 F.3d 1104,1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the policy is not to allow appeals from
orders that uphold arbitration under FAA § 16); OPC Farms, Inc. v. Conopco Inc., 154 F.3d 1047, 1049
(9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the policy under FAA § 16 "reflects the studied determination of Congress
to promote arbitration and to keep judicial involvement to the barest minimum"); Superpumper, Inc. v.
Nerland Oil, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1998) (stating that the policy under UAA § 19 is not to
allow appeals from orders upholding arbitration). But see Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. at 79 (finding that
order compelling arbitration that resolves the litigation with nothing more for the court to do than
execute judgment is a "final order" appealable under FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)).
96. See. e.g., Drahozal, supra note 34 (manuscript at p. 41, on file with author) (pointing out that in
a survey of 34 arbitration agreements between franchisors and franchisees, 16 arbitration clauses
prevented class actions in arbitration); Stemlight, supra note 33, at 16 (contending that companies
should not be allowed to use arbitration to preclude class actions in both litigation and arbitration). Cf.
Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141-42
(1997) (arguing that franchisors should adopt arbitration clauses to thwart class actions); Alan S.
Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me,But Who's the Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses
as a Defense, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 1998, at 24 (discussing the use of binding arbitration clauses
as an appropriate means to defeat class actions).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 42; 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1751, 2382-86 (2d ed. 1986); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 42.01 (3d ed. 2000).
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prohibiting consolidation,98 but this section is not meant to address the validity of
arbitration clauses in the context of class-wide disputes. The issues of class-action
arbitration and the validity of arbitration clauses prohibiting class-action litigation
and requiring arbitration of claims only in individual proceedings are the subject of
much litigation. 99 The Drafting Committee reached no conclusion about class-action
arbitration and this matter is not intended to be covered in section 10.
Section 10 should make it more likely that courts will consolidate arbitration
proceedings between parties with similar claims and that parties will address
consolidation in their arbitration agreements. As a result, these RUAA provisions
should foster both the goals ofproviding a more efficient and fair arbitration process
and of respecting party autonomy.

98. Section 4(a) allows waiver of the right to consolidate but only so long as the waiver is not
unconscionable, i.e., only "to the extent permitted by law." See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile,
Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1101-03 (W.D. Mich. 2000), on appealto Sixth Circuit, (finding an arbitration
provision is unconscionable in part because it waives class remedies allowable under Truth in Lending
Act ("TILA"), as well as certain declaratory and injunctive relief under federal and state consumer
protection laws); Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review
granted and opinion superseded, 995 P.2d 137 (Cal. 2000) (finding arbitration clause in contract of
employment voided as unconscionable, in part, because it would deprive arbitrator of authority to hear
classwide claim).
99. See, e.g., Lozada, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1101-03 (finding an arbitration provision is unconscionable
in part because it waives class remedies allowable under TILA, as well as certain declaratory and
injunctive relief under federal and state consumer protection laws); Keating v. SuperiorCourt, 645 P.2d
1192, 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev 'don other grounds, Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at I (determining that claims
of franchisees were arbitrable and that trial court should have considered whether to make arbitration
on a class-action basis); Ramirez, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916 (finding arbitration clause in contract of
employment voided as unconscionable, in part, because it would deprive arbitrator of authority to hear
classwide claim); Blue Cross of Calif, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 65, (concluding that federal preemption
doctrine does not preclude trial court from ordering classwide arbitration in accordance with state
decisional law); Powertel v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to enforce
arbitration clause as unconscionable in part because of its retroactive application to preexisting lawsuit
and because one factor as to its substantive unconscionability was that it precluded the possibility of
classwide relief). But cf Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366,378-79 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that neither the text nor the legislative history of TILA or the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA")
indicate an inherent conflict between TILA or EFTA and the right to arbitrate even though plaintiffs
cannot proceed under the class action provisions of these statutes); Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans,
Inc., No. 99 C 3952, 2000 WL 45493 at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 11, 2000) (same as to TILA claim); Brown v.
Surety Fin. Serv, Inc., No. 99 C 2405, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5734 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2000) (same);
Sagal v. First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999) (same); Zawikowski v.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 1999 WL 35304 (N.D. Il1.Jan. I1, 1999) (same); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin.,
991 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 178 F.2d 1149 (1 lth Cir. 1999), aff'd in
part and rev"d in part on other grounds, Green Tree Fin., 531 U.S. 79 (same); Howard v. Klynveld Peat
Marwick Goerderler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("A plaintiff.., who has agreed to
arbitrate all claims arising out of her employment may not avoid arbitration by pursuing class claims.
Such claims must be pursued in non-class arbitration."); Doctor's Assocs., v. Hollingsworth, 949 F.
Supp. 77, 80-81 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that class action contract claims brought by franchisees were
subject to arbitration provision of franchising agreement requiring individual arbitrations); Lopez v.
Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073 (N.D. I1. Apr. 25, 1996) (same); Meyers v. Univest
Home Loan, Inc., No. C93-1783, 1993 WL 307747 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 4, 1993) (holding that claims of
named-plaintiff asserted in class action under TILA and state consumer protection act must be
arbitrated); Erickson v. Painewebber, Inc., No. 87C 10592, 1990 WL 104152 (N.D. Ill.
July 13, 1990)
(holding that fraud claims of named-plaintiff asserted in class action must be arbitrated).
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C. Disclosure
Disclosure by arbitrators is an inherently difficult issue because, although parties
rightly expect arbitrators to be impartial, they choose arbitrators because of the
arbiters' expertise in a particular area. That expertise often involves business
interests, professional relationships, and an arbitrator's own biases and beliefs. The
UAA has no section regarding disclosure by arbitrators. The Drafting Committee
believed that this important subject should be included in the RUAA to insure
procedural fairness, to provide guidance for those involved in the process, and to
avoid vacatur challenges to awards on the grounds of evident partiality or
impropriety.
The standard for disclosure in section 12 is an objective one: an arbitrator must
disclose facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the arbitrator's
impartiality in deciding the case.l°° The statute requires that before an individual
accepts an appointment as an arbitrator, the person will make a reasonable inquiry
and disclose to the parties and to other arbitrators known facts, particularly interests
in the outcome or relationships with others involved in the arbitration proceeding,
that would likely affect impartiality as viewed from the perspective of a reasonable
person.'0 ' The obligation to disclose continues throughout the proceeding. 0 2 Either

100. R.U.A.A. § 12(a).
101. Id. §§ I1 (b), 12(a). Much of the law on the issue of arbitrator partiality stems from the seminal
case of Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), a decision
under the FAA. In that case the Supreme Court held that an undisclosed business relationship between
an arbitrator and one of the parties constituted "evident partiality" requiring vacating of the award.
Members of the Court differed, however, on the standards for disclosure. Justice Black, writing for a
four-judge plurality, concluded that disclosure of "any dealings that might create an impression of
possible bias" or creating "even an appearance of bias" would amount to evident partiality. Id. at 149.
Justice White, in a concurrence joined by Justice Marshall, supported a more limited test which would
require disclosure of"a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a
party." Id. at 150. Three dissenting justices favored an approach under which an arbitrator's failure to
disclose certain relationships established a rebuttable presumption of partiality.
Since Commonwealth Coatings, most circuit courts of appeal have applied the test as enunciated by
Justice White. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493,499 n.3 (4th
Cir. 1999) (noting that courts have given the concurrence particular weight); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp.
v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1992); Toyota of Berkely v. Automobile Salesmen's Union, Local
1095, 834 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1987); Morelite Const. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters, 748 F.2d 79
(2d Cir. 1984); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1983); Middlesex Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197 (11 th Cir. 1982); Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir.
1982). See also Dowd v. First Omaha Secs. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36, 38-44 (Neb. 1993) (discussing
Nebraska interpretation); DeBaker v. Shah, 533 N.W.2d 464, 467 n.4 (Wis. 1995) (noting that courts
have not followed the Black standard; rather, "they have adopted the reasoning of Justice White's
concurrence in the case which recognizes that arbitrators, who are often effective because of their
position in the marketplace, should not be disqualified because of a business relationship if it is disclosed
or is de minimus"); Beck Suppliers, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988) (stating that other Ohio decisions confirm that more is needed than "a speculation or
appearance of bias" but holding the arbitrator was impartial because there was no "proof of actual bias,"
and the relationship between the arbitrator and appellees was "too indirect and remote to substantiate
any inference of bias").
102. R.U.A.A. § 12(b). See, e.g., AAA INT'L ARB. R., ART 7: "Prior to accepting appointment, a
prospective arbitrator shall disclose to the administrator any circumstance likely to give rise tojustifiable
doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence. Once appointed, an arbitrator shall disclose
any additional such information to the parties and to the administrator."; IBA ETHICS FOR INT'L
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an arbitrator's failure to disclose facts giving rise to a conflict of interest or an
arbitrator's continuing to serve after such disclosure to which a party timely objects
may be grounds for vacatur under section 23 (a)(2). "3
The disclosure standards in section 12 apply to neutral and non-neutral
arbitrators but with different effects. The section's application to party arbitrators
was intended to insure the integrity of the process when panels of arbitrators,
including non-neutrals, decide an arbitration case. The Drafting Committee
concluded that it was important for all involved, particularly the neutral arbitrators,
to know the specific interests of arbitrators who were selected by the parties and who
may or may not be expected to be neutral in determining some or all of the issues.'4
However, unlike the situation with neutral arbitrators, the parties may agree to waive
all disclosure requirements by non-neutrals.' 0 5 Moreover, the grounds for vacatur
under section 23(a)(2) for a party arbitrator are corruption or prejudicial misconduct
and not the ground of evident partiality that applies only to neutrals.'t'
Even if a neutral arbitrator has failed to disclose an interest or relationship, it is
often difficult for parties to vacate an award under section 23(a)(2) for evident
partiality. 0 7 Without lowering the barrier of the finality of arbitration awards, the
ARBITRATORS R. 4.3: "The duty of disclosure continues throughout the arbitral proceedings as regards
new facts or circumstances."; RULES OF PRO. OF THE INTER-AM. COMM'L ARB. COMM'N, sec. I1,art. 9:
"A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who approach him in connection with his possible
appointment any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or
independence. An arbitrator, once appointed or chosen, shall disclose such circumstances to the parties
unless they have already been informed by him of these circumstances."
103. R.U.A.A. §§ 12(c), (d).
104. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 5 to R.U.A.A. § 12. See
also Nasca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 P.3d 346, 351 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that
a party-appointed arbitrator had duty to disclose substantial business relationship with the party);
McNaughton & Rodgers v. Besser, 932 P.2d 819 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding member of threeperson arbitration panel has duty to disclose facts that would persuade a reasonable person of bias).
Similarly, the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce provide:
Every arbitrator appointed or confirmed by the Court must remain independent of the
parties involved in the arbitration. Before appointment or confirmation by the Court, a
prospective arbitrator shall disclose in writing to the Secretary General of the Court any
facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into question the
arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties. Upon receipt of such information, the
Secretary General of the Court shall provide it to the parties in writing and fix a time-limit
for any comments from them. An arbitrator shall immediately disclose in writing to the
Secretary General of the Court and the parties any facts or circumstances of a similar nature
which may arise between the arbitrator's appointment or confirmation by the Court and the
notification of the final award.
I.C.C. Arb. Pro., art. 13, R. 7.
105. R.U.A.A. § 4(a). It is only in the case of neutral arbitrators that before an arbitration matter
arises parties cannot unreasonably restrict the right under. section 12 to disclosure of facts that might
cause a conflict of interest. R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(3).
106. Id. § 23(a)(2).
107. ANR Coal, 173 F.3d at 493 (finding that an arbitrator's failure to disclose relationship between
arbitrator's law firm and a party did not warrant vacating the award for evident partiality because
"nondisclosure, even of such facts, has no independent legal significance and does not in itself constitute
grounds for vacating an award"); Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that"[tihe party challenging the arbitration decision has the burden of showing partiality"when
claiming arbitrators had a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding); Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of Am., 48 F.3d 125, 125 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's
finding of bias on the basis of family relationship between arbitrator and one of the parties, stating that
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Drafting Committee concluded that when a neutral arbitrator fails to disclose "a
known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or
a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party," a court should presume
that the arbiter acted with evident partiality. 08 The shifting of the burden of proof
in this limited and somewhat extreme situation will require the neutral, who is in the
best position to know the exact nature and extent of the interest or relationship, to
explain the matter.
A Commissioner made a last-minute motion from the floor during the final
reading of the RUAA at the 2000 meeting of Committee of the Whole of NCCUSL.
The Drafting Committee reluctantly accepted the amendment, section 11 (b), which
provides that a person with "a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of
the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a
party" should not serve as a neutral arbitrator. " 9 The Drafting Committee hesitated
to accept the motion because it believed that professional arbitrators would not
accept appointment where they had such an interest or relationship. Moreover, the
presumption of vacatur in section 12(e) would apply to an award by an arbitrator0
who failed to disclose such an interest in the outcome or relationship with a party."
Section 11 (b) has two other problems. First, assume an arbitrator discloses what
the claimant in the arbitration considers "a known, existing, and substantial
relationship" with the respondent and the claimant objects under section 11 (b) to the
arbitrator's continued appointment. The arbitrator disagrees and overrules the
claimant's objection. The Drafting Committee intended to allow a duly appointed
arbitrator, and not the parties, to ultimately decide whether the arbitrator will
continue to serve in the face of objection by one of the parties."' Where an
arbitrator discloses what one party believes is "a known, existing, and substantial
relationship with a party" but continues to serve, section 12(c) applies so the

partiality must be direct, definite, and capable ofdemonstration with specific facts that prove bias); Polin
v. Kellwood Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 238,255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that to avoid summary confirmation
of an arbitration where one party alleges that arbitrator was biased, the standard is "high and a party
moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof"); Federal Vending, Inc. v. Steak & Ale of Florida,
Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that judicial review is limited, and the bases
for vacating an award are "narrow" and refusing to vacate award on ground ofevident partiality because
arbitratordid not disclose liquidated damage award to one of the parties in prior arbitration); In re Carina
Int'l Shipping Corp., 961 F. Supp. 559, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (determining that "judicial review of an
arbitral award is rather narrow" and that "[a] party seeking to overturn an arbitration award is under a
heavy burden to prove that the standards for such relief have been met," which party did not meet in
alleging bias by one arbitrator to act due to undisclosed financial interest); Hobet Mining, Inc. v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 877 F. Supp. 1011, 1019 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (stating that "even where the failure
to disclose [a family relationship between arbitrator and one of the parties] is 'a material violation of the
ethical standards applicable to arbitration proceedings, it does not follow that the arbitration award may
be nullified judicially'); Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp. 392, 392 (D. Conn. 1994) (noting that
the FAA has a strong presumption in favor of enforcing awards and that a court will not vacate an award
on grounds of evident partiality due to arbitrator's undisclosed involvement in litigation similar to the
subject matter of the arbitration).
108. R.U.A.A. § 12(e).
109. R.U.A.A. § 11(b).
110. See R.U.A.A. §§ 12(e), 23(a)(2).
I 1. See, e.g., McNaughton & Rodgers, 932 P.2d 819 (concluding that chairman of arbitration panel
acted appropriately when refusing to recuse a panel member who had a relationship with one of the
parties because the objecting party failed to demonstrate evident partiality).
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challenging party's remedy is not a pre-award motion to a court to remove the
arbitrator but rather a motion, after the arbitrator's decision, to vacate an adverse
award without the presumption of vacatur in section 12(e). Thus, the precatory
language of section 11(b) serves little purpose other than an admonition that most
arbitrators would heed regardless of this provision.
Second, the language in section 1 (b) intimates that where a person has a
conflicting interest or relationship that is less than "a known, direct, and material
interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and
substantial relationship with a party," the person may serve as a neutral arbitrator.
Such an interpretation is not the intent of the standard carefully outlined in section
12. Section 1l(b) will do a disservice if courts interpret it to allow individuals to
serve as neutral arbitrators despite a conflict that might not rise to the level of "a
known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or
a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party," but that would still
cause a reasonable person to question the arbiter's impartiality under section 12(a).
Finally, it should be noted that, to some extent, the parties may agree to change
the standard of disclosure by a neutral arbitrator. Section 12's disclosure
requirements conform to those generally found in the case law,"' but the rules of
some arbitration organizations and the norms in certain fields of arbitration".3 may
provide higher or lower guidelines. The RUAA provides that before a claim arises,
parties may vary the disclosure requirements provided they do not unreasonably
restrict the right under section 12 to disclosure of any facts by a neutral arbitrator. '
This limited right to waive disclosure requirements recognizes that the parties may
fashion provisions suitable to their situation if they do not unreasonably impinge
upon the right to arbitrator disclosure of important information.
The disclosure provisions of section 12 are critically important to insure both
party choice and fairness in the arbitration process. They establish consistent
standards so arbitrators, parties, and their attorneys or representatives will know what
information the arbiters must provide. The primary intent of section 12 is to insure
access to information that might reasonably affect arbitrator impartiality. If persons
know that arbitrators have a duty to disclose such information, they will have faith
in arbitration as a just decision-making process.

112. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); William
C. Vick Constr. Co. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Fed'n, 472 S.E.2d 346, 348 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
See also TEX. CIV. PR.AC. & REM. CODE § 172.056. A primary model for the disclosure standard in
section 12 is the AAA!ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS INCOMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977),
which embodies the principle that "arbitrators should disclose the existence of any interests or
relationships which are likely to affect their impartiality or which might reasonably create the appearance
of partiality or bias." Canon 11,p.6.
113. For instance, in labor arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement because the parties
often interact with each other and arbitrators, and have personal relationships with each other and
arbitrators, the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES provides: "There should be no attempt to be secretive about such friendships or acquaintances
but disclosure is not necessary unless some feature of aparticular relationship might reasonably appear
to impair impartiality." § 2.B.3.a. Thus a reasonable person in the field of labor arbitration may not
expect personal, professional, or other past relationships to be disclosed. In other fields where parties
do not have ongoing relationships, an arbitrator may be required to disclose such relationships.
114. R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(3).
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D. Remedies
The RUAA treats remedies in section 8, concerning provisional remedies, and
section 21, concerning final remedies. In arbitration, as in litigation, parties
sometimes need provisional relief to insure the fairness of the process. Under
present case law arbitrators clearly have broad authority to order provisional
measures that are the equivalent of civil remedies, such as attachment, replevin, and
sequestration to preserve assets, or to make preliminary rulings requiring parties to
undertake certain acts that affect the subject matter of the arbitration proceeding. " 5
The primary issue regarding authority to order provisional remedies during
arbitration is whether a judge or an arbitrator is the appropriate authority to issue the
remedy. One difficulty raised by allowing a court to grant interim relief is that
judicial action may preempt the arbitrator's authority to decide a case because the
judge would be required to assess the probability of success on the merits even
though in their arbitration agreement, the parties authorized the arbitrator to decide
the merits of their dispute. Additionally, by granting a court jurisdiction to award
preliminary remedies, the parties become entangled in the cost, delay, and
complexities of litigation that they sought to avoid by agreeing to arbitration in the
first place.
On the other hand, there are problems with giving only arbitrators the authority
to grant provisional remedies. A major concern is that arbitrators' orders are not
self-enforcing." 6 As such, parties may disregard arbitral orders to preserve assets
or take other provisional actions necessary to insure that the subject matter of the
arbitration is protected for a final determination.
The basic approach of section 8 is that before an arbitrator is appointed to
consider a dispute, a court may order provisional remedies to protect the

115. Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, Fla., 729 F.2d 1046, 1047 (6th Cir. 1984),
abrogated by Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (upholding under
FAA arbitrator's interim award requiring city to continue performance of coal purchase contract until
further order of arbitration panel); Fraulo v. Gabelli, 657 A.2d 704, 717 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)

(upholding under UAA arbitrator's issuance of preliminary orders regarding sale and proceeds of
property); Fishman v. Streeter, Nos. 60341,62193, 1992 WL 146830, *5 (Ohio Ct. App., June 25, 1992)
(upholding under UAA arbitrator's interim order dissolving partnership); Park City Assoc. v. Total
Energy Leasing Corp., 396 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (upholding under New York state

arbitration statute a preliminary injunction by an arbitrator). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-6
(allowing provisional remedies such as "attachment, replevin, sequestration and other corresponding or
equivalent remedies"); A.A.A., COMMERCIAL DiSP. RESOL PRO. R-36, 45 (allowing arbitrator to take
"whatever interim measures he or she deems necessary, including injunctive reliefand measures for the
protection or conservation of property and disposition of perishable goods. Such interim measures may
take the form of an interim award, and the arbitrator may require security for costs of such measures.");
C.P.R. RULES 12.1, 13.1 (allowing interim measures including those "for preservation of assets, the
conservation of goods or the sale of perishable goods," requiring "security for the costs of these
measures," and permitting "interim, interlocutory and partial awards"); UNCITRA L COMMERCIAL. ARB.

RULES, art. 17 (providing that arbitrators may take "such interim measure of protection as the arbitral
tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute," including security for
costs); MACNEIL TREATISE, supranote 35, at II §§ 25.1.2, 25.3 & I1136.1.
116. See Timothy J. Heinsz, An Arbitrator's Authority to Subpoena: A Power in Need of
Clarification, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 38TH ANN. MEETING, NAT'L ACADEMY OF ARB. 201, 210 (BNA

Books 1985).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

21

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2001, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2001, No. I

effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding." 7 After the arbitrator is appointed, the
arbitrator issues any necessary provisional remedies. 118 However, after appointment
of an arbitrator when a matter is "urgent" and the arbitrator does not have the time
or power to act, a party may seek provisional relief from a court." 9
Section 18 is intended to overcome the concern that arbitrators' orders are not
self-enforcing. 120 If an arbitrator grants a provisional remedy or makes a pre-award
ruling with which a party refuses to comply, section 18 allows the other party to seek
from an appropriate court "an expedited order" to confirm the arbitrator's
determination. 2' The court must act on the arbitrator's ruling as expeditiously as
possible to avoid dissipation of assets or loss of the subject matter of the arbitration
proceeding. Nor should the court become entangled in a substantive appraisal of the
merits of the arbitrator's decision on preliminary relief because a court may review
the arbitral order only under the limited standards of section 23 for vacatur and
section 24 for modification.' 22
Section 21 of the RUAA deals with final remedies. 2 3 This provision
demonstrates both the breadth and the limit of arbitrators' power to grant relief and24
of parties' autonomy to shape their agreement about remedies. Section 21(c)'
preserves arbitrators' traditional, broad right under the UAA, FAA and case law to

117. R.U.A.A. § 8(a). Even if a court issues a provisional remedy prior to the appointment of an
arbitrator, after the arbitrator is selected the arbitrator has the authority to determine whether the courtordered remedy should remain in effect. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Salvano, 999 F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir. 1993) (granting temporary restraining order to prevent defendant
from soliciting clients or disclosing client information but "only until the arbitration panel is able to
address whether the TRO should remain in effect. Once assembled, an arbitration panel can enter
whatever temporary injunctive relief it deems necessary to maintain the status quo.").
118. R.U.A.A. § 8(b)(l).
119. Id. § 8(b)(2). See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir. 1989)
(stating that a court order to protect the status quo is necessary "to protect the integrity of the applicable
dispute resolution process"); Hughley v. Rocky Mountain Health Maint. Org., Inc., 927 P.2d 1325, 1329
(Colo. 1996) (providing that court grants preliminary injunction to continue status quo that health
maintenance organization must provide chemotherapy treatment when denial of the relief would make
the arbitration process a futile endeavor); King County v. Boeing Co., 570 P.2d 713, 714 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1977) (denying request for declaratory judgment because the issue was for determination by the
arbitrators rather than the court).
120. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment I to R.U.A.A. § 18.
121. R.U.A.A. § 18. By use of the term "expedited," the RUAA intends that a court should give
priority to a request to enforce an order under section 18. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra
note 6, at Official Comment 2 to R.U.A.A. § 18. Further, to limit litigation on arbitral pre-award rulings,
a party cannot appeal a court decision on the matter under section 28. See 2000 Styled Act with
Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 3 to R.U.A.A. § 18.
An arbitrator's order denying a request for a pre-award ruling is not subject to an action for review
under section 18 because such a provision would lead to delay and more litigation without corresponding
benefit to the process and the primary reason to allow a court to consider a favorable pre-award ruling
is because such arbitral orders are not self-enforcing. The parties whose pre-award requests for relief
are denied by an arbitrator may seek review of such denial after the final award is issued under section
20, vacatur, or section 2 1, modification or correction of an award.
122. R.U.A.A. § 18.
123. Id. § 21.
124. Id. § 21(c).
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fashion relief.'25 This section continues to sanction arbitrators' remedial creativity,
even exceeding the authority of courts, which are circumscribed by principles of law
and equity. An arbitrator is not bound by standards of law, but "may order such
26
remedies as the arbitrator considers just and appropriate under the circumstances.',
To insure comprehensive authority to award relief, the Drafting Committee retained
the UAA's similar language that "[t]he fact that such a remedy could not or would
not be granted by the court" is not a ground for a court to refuse to confirm or to
vacate an award.' 27 Thus, section 21(c) maintains the principle of allowing
arbitrators freedom to craft appropriate remedies for the particular situation that
arises in arbitration. This remedial discretion remains one of the hallmarks of
arbitration.
However, two areas in section 21, attorney's fees and punitive damages, are
quite different from the traditional, broad powers of arbitrators to order remedies and
provide examples of limits on the policy of party autonomy. Under the UAA
arbitrators could not award fees of counsel unless the parties' agreement specifically
allowed for them. 2 The RUAA changes this prohibition so that arbitrators may now
award attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of arbitration. 2 9 Most
jurisdictions presently recognize the authority of arbitrators to award punitive
damages. 3 ° The RUAA has adopted this majority view, but subsections 21 (a) and
21(b) limit arbitrators to making awards of punitive damages and attorney's fees
only if "authorized by law in a civil action.''. This restriction is not applicable to
other remedies under section 2 1(c). ' It should be noted that, although section 21 (b)
requires a legal basis for awarding attorney's fees, this language was not intended
to authorize courts to review these awards on the ground of inappropriate application
of the law.' The general rule that a reviewing court should not vacate or
3 4 refuse to
confirm an arbitral award of attorney's fees on this ground still applies.

125. MACNEIL TREATISE, supra note 6, at IIl ch. 36; Michael Hoellering, Remedies in Arbitration,
ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1984); David Co. v. Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc., 444 N.W.2d 836, 842

(Minn. 1989); SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (N.Y. 1976).
126. R.U.A.A. § 21(c).
127. Id. § 21(c). See U.A.A. § 12(a).
128. U.A.A. § 10.
129. R.U.A.A. § 21(b).
130. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52; Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Anderson
v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d 117 (W. Va. 1987); Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993);
Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. McFadden, 509 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Bishop
v. Holy Cross Hosp., 410 A.2d 630 (Md. App. 1980); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d
726 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Grissom v. Greener
& Sumner Constr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). But see Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 698
P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976); School City of E.
Chicago, Ind. v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, 422 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
131. R.U.A.A. § 21(a), (b).
132. Quite contrary to sections 21(a) and (b), section 21(c) provides that even if a court could not
grant a particular remedy, this fact "is not a ground for refusing to confirm an award under section 22
or for vacating an award under section 23."
133. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 2 to R.U.A.A. § 21.
134. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("An
award may not be vacated... on the grounds that the arbitrators' opinion fails to interpret correctly the
law applicable to the issues in dispute in the arbitration proceeding."). See also Maidman v. O'Brien,
473 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of
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The RUAA places even further limits on arbitrators' authority to award punitive
damages. Section 21 (a) permits arbitrators to award punitive or other exemplary
remedies only when the evidence would permit a court to award such relief.'35 Thus,
unlike an award of attorney's fees or other remedies, a reviewing court could pass
upon the legal propriety of a punitive damages award. To insure an arbitrator uses
the appropriate evidentiary and legal standards, section 21(e) mandates that the
arbitrator must separately state the amount of punitive damages or other exemplary
relief and provide the basis in fact and in law for authorizing such award.'36 The
requirement of an arbiter's statement as to the factual and legal basis for punitive
damages is an exception to the general
3 7 rule that arbitrators need not write an opinion
or give rationales for their awards.
The requirements in section 21 (a), that there must be evidence sufficient to
prove punitive damages the same as in a civil action, and section 21(e), that
arbitrators must state the basis in law for punitive awards, 3 ' went beyond the
recommendations of the Drafting Committee, 3 9 but the Committee of the Whole of
the Uniform Law Commissioners adopted these requirements upon a
Commissioner's motion made during the second reading of the RUAA in August
2000. The Committee of the Whole approved these provisions because some
Commissioners raised concerns about the nature of punitive relief and the limited
scope of judicial review of arbitral punitive damages awards. However, the
consequences of these additional limitations on arbitrators' authority to award
punitive remedies could be detrimental to the arbitration process. These mandates
in sections 2 1(a) and (e) will likely guarantee a court challenge by the losing party
to vacate any punitive damages award by claiming insufficient evidence or improper
application by the arbitrator of the law of punitive damages to the facts of the case. 4

Section 10(a)(4) of FederalArbitration Act (9 USCS § IO(a)(4)) Providingfor Vacating ofArbitration
Awards Where ArbitratorsExceed orImperfectly Execute Powers, 136 A.L.R. FED. 183, 428-30 (1997)
(discussing courts' general refusal to vacate an award for "manifest disregard" of the law, and listing
cases in which courts refused to so vacate awards).
135. R.U.A.A. § 21(a).
136. Id. § 21(e).
137. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (stating that
"[airbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award"); Atlanta Gas Light Co.
v. Trinity Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 500 S.E.2d 374,377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding
that an arbitrator is not required to enter written findings of fact or law to support an award, neither is
she required to show the reasoning behind the award); McKibben v. Grigg, 582 N.W.2d 669, 671 (N. D.
Ct. App. 1998) (finding that there is no general rule that arbitrators must find facts and give reasons for
their awards); R. D. Hursh, Annotation, Necessity That Arbitrators, in Making Award Make Specific
Detailed Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, 82 A.L.R.2d 969, (1962) ("It seems established
beyond a peradventure that, absent a statute or a stipulation in the arbitration agreement itself that the
award of the arbitrator must meet specific formal requirements, an arbitration award need not recite the
arbitrator's findings of fact or conclusions of law.").
138. The prerequisites outlined in section 21(a) for utilizing the same evidentiary standards as in a
judicial action and in section 21(e) of the award giving the basis in law for punitive damages are
waivable under RUAA section 4(a). Thus, in their arbitration agreements parties may not require these
evidentiary rules or legal standards.
139. See 2000 Annual Meeting, supra note 7, § 21; March 2000 Draft, supra note 5, § 21.
140. In order to ensure that there is a factual and legal basis for a punitive damages remedy, parties
and arbitrators will almost certainly need a transcript of the arbitration hearing. This will drive up the
costs of arbitration.
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Such court actions will add significantly to the time and cost of the arbitration
process, thereby adversely impacting the important goals of cost savings and
efficiency which most parties desire when they voluntarily agree to arbitration.' 41
This result of more legal requirements and greater possibility of court action42 likely
will reinforce the existing hesitancy of arbitrators to award punitive relief.
There is another difference in the statute between the remedies of punitive
damages and attorney's fees. Unlike an award of attorney's fees, 14 the parties
cannot by agreement confer authority on an arbitrator to grant punitive damages.
The statute draws this distinction because punitive damages entail the power to
punish for a public injury beyond that of the immediate parties to the dispute.'4" The
statute does not confer on the parties the power by private agreement to authorize an
arbitrator to grant punitive relief when that remedy would otherwise not be available
under law.
Section 21 is a waivable provision.'45 Thus, the parties' agreement may limit
or eliminate the authority of arbitrators to grant some types of final remedies.' 46 For
instance, parties may determine that in their situation an arbitrator should not have
authority to award monetary relief or to order specified actions, such as
reinstatement of a terminated worker in an employment dispute. The Drafting
Committee intended to allow parties autonomy to shape the remedial provisions of
their arbitration agreement in a manner best suited to their circumstances.
However, a caveat is in order about limitations on remedies, particularly in
regard to attorney's fees and punitive damages. Section 4(a) allows waiver of certain
RUAA provisions but "only to the extent permitted by law."' 14' The Drafting
Committee intended this language to incorporate developing theories of adhesion

141. See supra Part 1. regarding the goals of the Drafting Committee in writing the RUAA.
142. Recent data from the securities industry provides some evidence that arbitrators are generally
reluctant to award punitive or other exemplary damages and do not abuse the power to punish through
excessive awards. See generally Richard Ryder, Punitive Award Survey, 8 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR,
Nov. 1996, at 4; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization ofArbitration, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
143. RUAA § 21(b) allows an arbitrator to grant reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses of
arbitration "by agreement of the parties to the arbitration proceeding." There is no similar provision in
§ 21(a) on punitive damages.
144. See. e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 261 (1984) ("The basis for allowance
of punitive damages rests upon the principle that they are allowed as a punishment to the offender for
the general benefit of society, both as a restraint upon the transgressor and as a warning and example to
deter the commission of like offenses in the future."); Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308,
1320 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Punitive damages ... are intended to provide a punishment for the benefit of
society as a restraint upon the transgressor, and as a warning and example serving as a deterrent to
commission of like offenses in the future."); Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive
Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993) (discussing nature of punitive damages
generally); Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Arbitrator's Power to Award Punitive Damages, 83
A.L.R.3d 1037 (2000) (noting that punitive damages are assessed "largely for the public benefit" and
also stating that "[p]unitive damages are generally awarded in the interest of society ... in order to
punish the particular party involved and to serve as an example to deter him and others from committing
like offenses in the future").
145. R.U.A.A. § 4(a).
146. Unlike section 21, parties cannot waive section 8 on provisional remedies before a claim arises.
R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(l).
147. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 3 to R.U.A.A. § 4.
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and unconscionability into the arbitration process under the RUAA. 4 Today many
arbitrations involve statutory rights that would have authorized a judge orjury under
the applicable statute to order attorney's fees or punitive damages to a prevailing
party if the matter had been in a court. 49 For example, an employer may require an
employee to arbitrate all disputes arising from the employment relationship and may
further eliminate the arbitrator's authority to award punitive damages or attorney's
fees. The RUAA would seem to allow this waiver.50 However, a growing body of
case law holds that where an employer or other person with superior bargaining
power requires employees or persons. in adhesion situations to arbitrate statutory
rights, such as those under anti-discrimination laws that grant remedies of punitive
damages or attorney's fees, the person with the greater power cannot force the
weaker party to forgo remedies in arbitration that would otherwise be available in
court.' 5 ' These holdings cast doubt upon the validity of waivers or limitations of
some remedies in arbitrations dealing with statutory rights.
Section 2 1(c) gives arbitrators wide discretion to fashion remedies to meet the
needs of a particular case, but sections 2 1(a) and (b) concerning punitive damages
and attorney's fees have special limits on arbitrators' remedial authority. Similarly,
section 4(a) recognizes the parties' autonomy in their arbitration agreement to shape
the remedies an arbitrator may award. However, in some instances, particularly
those involving issues of statutory rights, the law may limit the parties' ability to
eliminate or circumscribe some remedies.
E. Vacatur
Sometimes the importance of a revision is not in what is changed but in what is
not. This is the case with vacatur. There was a minor addition to the grounds on
which a court must vacate an arbitrator's award. Section 23(a)(6) is a new basis for

148. See discussion supra on waivability of rights Part I.B.
149. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (age discrimination); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477
(securities laws); Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. 220 (securities law and civil RICO claims);
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614 (antitrust claim). Seealso 1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 118, 105 Star. 1071, 1081 ("arbitration ... is encouraged to resolve disputes" under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
150. R.U.A.A. § 4(a).
151. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
employee with race discrimination claim under Title VII is bound by pre-dispute arbitration agreement

under FAA if the employee has the right to the same relief as if he had proceeded in court); Graham Oil
Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1995) (providing that arbitration clause

compelling franchisee to surrender important rights, including right of attomey fees, guaranteed by the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, contravenes this statute); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that award under arbitration clause requiring each side to pay
own attorney's fees in Title VII claim on which plaintiffprevailed but where arbitrators refused to award

attorney's fees set aside as a manifest disregard of the law; the arbitration of statutory claims as a
condition ofemployment are enforceable only to the extent that the arbitration preserves protections and
remedies afforded by the statute); Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694 (stating limitation in arbitration agreement

on remedies for employee to only backpay and not allowing employee in anti-discrimination claim to
attempt recovery of punitive damages or attorney's fees contributes to determination that arbitration
clause is void as unconscionable).
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vacatur relating to the requirement by a person under section 9152 to give proper
notice to initiate an arbitration proceeding.' 53 The Drafting Committee did not intend
4
notice of commencement of an arbitration to be a formal pleading requirement.
Thus, a party waives the objection by failing to protest the lack or insufficiency of
initial notice before the arbitration hearing begins.' 55 Additionally, before vacating
an award on the ground of improper notice of initiation, a court must find that the
56
objecting party suffered substantial prejudice because of this failure.'
A more fundamental matter concerning vacatur is what was not added to section
23. One of the issues most debated by the Drafting Committee was whether to
include a provision authorizing parties by contract to "opt-in" to judicial review of
arbitration awards for errors of law.' 57 In other words, it was proposed that the
RUAA should sanction agreements to have a court review an arbitrator's decision
where the arbitrator failed to follow the law on a particular matter. The Drafting
Committee recognized strong policy considerations both for and against this
proposal. Proponents argued that freedom to choose an opt-in provision is a
fundamental element of party autonomy to determine the type of arbitration system
and review of arbitral awards. By adding a section sanctioning the opt-in approach,
they contended that more parties would know of this right to have a court review an
arbitrator's errors of law and would be more likely to include review clauses.
Additionally, the statute would establish a single standard for an opt-in provision that
would be the basis for review in all cases. 58 Further, proponents believed that
parties who were otherwise hesitant to use arbitration would be more likely to choose
this process if they could insure a more liberal standard of judicial review than the
narrow grounds in the UAA or FAA. 5 9 In other words, advocates for the opt-in
approach expressed fear that under existing law a "bonehead" award by an arbitrator
cannot be challenged in the absence of fraud, evident partiality, or exceeding of
powers. 160
The opponents to the opt-in provision believed the proposal carried a number
of hazards. A significant concern was that such a provision would encourage
attorneys to include opt-in clauses in arbitration agreements to insure appeal from
an adverse decision. The resulting routine inclusion of opt-in clauses would

152. Section 9 is also a new provision which has been added to the RUAA.
153. See discussion supra regarding initiation of the arbitration process Part H.A. RUAA §4(b)(2)
prohibits a party from unreasonably restricting the right to notice of initiation of an arbitration under
RUAA §9 before a claim arises.
154. Parties may agree to change the notification provisions outlined in section 9 by agreement, so
long as they do not unreasonably restrict the right to notice of commencement of the arbitration
proceedings. R.U.A.A. §§ 4(b)(2), 9(a).
155. R.U.A.A. § 9(b).
156. Id. § 23(a)(6).
157. Although there was some discussion about an "opt-in" provision for arbitral errors of fact in the
meetings of the Drafting Committee from the outset, the focus of this provision was on errors of law.
See, e.g., October 1997 Draft, supra note 5, § 19. The Drafting Committee believed that it should not
sanction agreements that would involve the court in the fact-finding process of an arbitration. Id.
158. For example, the February 1999 draft of the RUAA included for consideration a provision that
parties could contract forjudicial review of arbitration awards to be vacated for errors of law but not for
errors of fact. See February 1999 Draft, supra note 5, § 19(b).
159. See U.A.A. § 12(a); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
160. See R.U.A.A. § 23(a).
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effectively undermine the finality of arbitral awards. Opponents also asserted that
to assure meaningful review of an arbitrator's decision, parties would find it
necessary to require transcripts and have an arbitrator make detailed findings of fact
and law. These requirements, the opponents argued, would add significantly to the
cost of arbitration. They asserted that if parties distrust arbitration or have a dispute
requiring broadened judicial review and more costly procedures, these parties should
forgo arbitration and should instead rely on litigation.
Opponents of the opt-in provision also raised two legal questions about the
advisability of including an opt-in section in the RUAA. The first was whether a
state arbitration law providing for a particular standard ofjudicial review for arbitral
errors of law might conflict with future Supreme Court holdings about whether and
to what extent parties may choose a standard other than the four grounds in section
10(a) of the FAA161 for judicial vacatur of arbitration awards. Standards in a state
arbitration statute differing from those which might evolve under the FAA would
create a substantial risk of federal preemption. 62 The second legal issue was
whether parties by contract could expand upon the four vacatur grounds in either the
UAA 63 or the FAA' 64 by conferring jurisdiction on a court to review for errors of
law or fact. The contention was that parties cannot contractually "create" subjectmatter jurisdiction in the courts that does not otherwise exist under the statute."ls
Like the members of the Drafting Committee, the courts have disagreed on the
propriety of opt-in clauses in arbitration agreements. Two federal courts of appeal
have approved such provisions and two have not. In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v.
MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of an

arbitration agreement that allowed judicial review for errors of law. The court
concluded that the parties had the power to contract for such review based upon7
Supreme Court precedent favoring party autonomy in arbitration agreements .
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in a split decision, LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp.'16 held that parties were not limited to the FAA's four vacatur grounds' 69 but
may contract for a court to set aside an arbitrator's award for errors of fact or law.

161. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
162. See discussion supra of federal preemption Part I.A.
163. U.A.A. § 12(a).
164. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
165. For the differing positions of the proponents and opponents for a provision in the RUAA
allowing for parties to opt-in to ajudicial standard of review for errors of law or fact see 2000 StylerlAct
with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment B to R.U.A.A. § 24.
166. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
167. Id. at 996. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in FirstOptions of Chicago v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52 and Volt, 489 U.S. 468.
168. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997). LaPine was a 2-1 decision with the majority opinion written by
Judge Fernandez who simply brushed aside any concern about parties "creating" jurisdiction. Judge
Kozinski concurred with Judge Fernandez but expressed doubt about whether Congress had authorized
review beyond the grounds stated in section 10(a) of the FAA. Judge Mayer dissented on the ground
that the court did not have authority to review an arbitration award in any manner that the parties agreed
to in their arbitration clause.

169. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
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According to the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has made it clear that courts
must enforce the FAA in accordance with the parties' agreement. 70
To the contrary of Gateway Technologies and LaPine are Chicago
Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times17 ' and UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer
Sciences Corp. 72 In Chicago Typographical Union the Seventh Circuit noted that
although parties may contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review an
arbitrator's award, they cannot contract for judicial review beyond the four FAA
grounds for vacatur' 73 The court reasoned that to allow such a contract would
enable the parties impermissibly to "create" federal jurisdiction.' 74 In UHC the
Eighth Circuit cautioned against the holdings in Gateway Technologies and LaPine
and expressed considerable doubt about whether parties may agree that a court may
set aside an arbitrator's award on a ground other than those stated in the FAA.'"
Unanimity has also eluded the few state courts that have addressed the authority
of parties to include opt-in provisions in their arbitration agreements. Some have
allowed an opt-in provision while others have found improper any change in or
additions to the statutory vacatur grounds. 176 A review of both the federal and state
case law indicates no definite trend concerning the legitimacy of a contractual opt-in
provision for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
A majority of the Drafting Committee ultimately determined that a vacatur
ground for an opt-in provision was unwarranted, and a vote of the Committee of the
Whole ofNCCUSL at the 1999 annual meeting during the first reading of the RUAA
confirmed this decision. The Drafting Committee and NCCUSL agreed that the
policy of autonomy of contract advanced by the proponents of an opt-in section was
important, but general concern remained about the effect ofenhanced judicial review
on the conclusiveness of arbitral awards. Even more important, the present
uncertainty in federal and state law concerning the propriety of additional grounds
forjudicial review of arbitral decisions, such as contractual agreements to reverse for
errors of law or fact, militated against inclusion. In particular, neither the Drafting

170. 130 F.3d at 892. The majority relied upon opt-in to ajudicial standard in Volt, 489 U.S. 468;
PrimaPaint, 388 U.S. 395; and the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Technologies, 64 F.3d 993.
171. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
172. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
173. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
174. 935 F.2d at 1505.
175. For two commentators refuting the argument that an "opt-in" review clause is precluded on the
ground of creating jurisdiction, see Alan Scott Rau, ContractingOut of the ArbitrationAct, 8 AM. REV.
OF INTERN'L ARB. 225 (1997) and Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In "forJudicialReview of ErrorsofLaw under
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. OF INTERN'L ARB. 263 (1997).
176. Compare Chicago, Southshore & South Bend R.R. v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transp. Dist.,
682 N.E.2d 156, 159 (III. App. Ct. 1997), rev'don other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 7 (111. App. Ct. 1998)
(refusing to give effect to an arbitration clause permitting a party to set aside an arbitration award due
to an error of law because it went beyond the statutory ground for vacatur) and Dick v. Dick, 534
N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (disallowing an opt-in clause as a hybrid form of arbitration that
did not comport with the Michigan arbitration statute) with Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick &
Assocs., 640 A.2d 788 (1994) (determining that "parties are free to expand the scope ofjudicial review
by providing for such expansion in their contract"). See also NAB Constr. Corp. v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 579 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1992) (approving a contractual provision allowing court review of an
arbitrator's decision if it was arbitrary, capricious or so grossly erroneous so as to evidence bad faith).
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Committee nor NCCUSL wanted to risk preemption of the important section on
vacatur because an opt-in provision would run contrary to future federal law.
As the Official Comments make clear, however, the decision not to include an
opt-in section in the RUAA was not intended to prohibit parties from agreeing to
such review where appropriate.'77 Until state and federal courts finally determine the
standards of
propriety of opt-in clauses, parties remain free to agree to whatever
7
judicial scrutiny that they desire to challenge arbitration awards.
Another provision the Drafting Committee considered but rejected in section 23
would have authorized parties to include an internal, appellate review mechanism in
their arbitration agreements. Under such mechanisms parties agree that they may
appeal to an appellate tribunal the award of the arbitrator who initially hears and
decides the case.' 79 Such an internal, appellate review does not raise the issue of
creating jurisdiction, as is the case with an opt-in clause, because the procedure does
not entangle courts in the arbitral decision-making process. For this same reason,
there is no risk of federal preemption under the FAA. However, the Drafting
Committee determined that there was no need to include specific authorization in the
statute because parties presently have the contractual power and in some cases do
provide for appeals within their arbitration systems. 0 Moreover, the thrust of
section 23 is to validate the power of courts and not private bodies, such as an
arbitral appellate panel, to vacate improper decisions by arbitrators on the narrow,
statutory grounds outlined in this provision.
The Drafting Committee weighed two other grounds for vacatur-where a
particular award either violates public policy' or involves manifest disregard of the
law." 2 For many years, federal appellate courts and most state courts have
recognized these nonstatutory grounds as a basis to review arbitral awards.""'

177. See 2000 StyledAct with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment B.5. to R.U.A.A. § 24.
178. For further discussion of the issue of opt-in provisions and the RUAA in this symposium, see
Hayford, supra note 3 1.
179. A number of arbitration organizations already provide in their rules for arbitral, appellate review.
See, e.g., CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR Arbitration Appeal Procedure, available at
http://www.cpradr.org (last modified March 21, 2001); Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services
("JAMS"), Arbitration Guide and Rules, Optional Appeal Procedure, available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/optionalArbAppeal (last visited April 8, 2001).
180. See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford and Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Callfor Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 405-06 (1995).
181. See Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration if wards: 7he Clash Between the
Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988); Stephen L. layford,
A New Paradigi for ComnimercialArbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between ReasonedAwards
and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 477-80 (1998); Stephen L.
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial ArbitrationA wards, 30 GA.
L. REV. 731 (1996); Brett Randall, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created
Standards ofReviewforArbitration A wards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 759; Laurie A. Tribble, Note, Vacating
Arbitrator's Awards Under the Public Policy Exception: Are Courts Second Guessing Arbitrator's
Decisions?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1051 (1993).
182. See Hayford, A New Paradigm, supra note 181; Hayford, Law in Disarray, supra note 181; Brad
A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the
Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard." 27 IND. L. REV. 241 (1993);
183. See Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: The Key to
Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DisP. RESOL. 117; Hayford, Law in Disarray. supra note
181.
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The genesis for setting aside particular arbitration awards that violate public
policy is the United States Supreme Court decision in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber
Workers."4 There the Court upheld the validity of a collective-bargaining agreement
against an employer's challenge that the contract violated public policy because it
required the lay off of employees by seniority. The employer claimed that the labor
contract ran counter to its agreement with a governmental agency that the employer
would maintain a certain percentage of minority and female employees regardless
of their seniority. The employer argued that it could not meet its obligations under
the accord with the federal agency unless the labor contract was voided on publicpolicy grounds. The Court noted the general doctrine, rooted in common law, that
5
a judicial body may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy. '
However, the Court stated that before voiding an arbitration award on this rationale
"[s]uch a public policy . . . must be well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.""11 6 The Court concluded that the
collective-bargaining agreement did not violate public policy because the employer
could meet its contractual obligations both to the union and to the federal
government either by rescinding the lay off of employees or by paying damages to
those improperly laid off under either agreement.
The Supreme Court reiterated this stringent application of the public-policy
s7
doctrine to vacate arbitration awards in Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.," which
refused to overturn an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee discharged for
violating employer rules regarding drugs. As in W.R. Grace, the Court determined
that the public policy invoked by the party seeking vacatur must be "explicit," "well
defined" and "dominant," and then concluded that a court could overturn an arbitral
award only if it created an "explicit conflict with other 'laws and legal precedents'
rather than an assessment of 'general considerations of supposed public interests."""s
The Court found no violation of a specific public policy by the arbitrator's
reinstatement order.
Although the W.R. Graceand Misco standards are rigorous on their face, parties
seeking to overturn an arbitrator's decision have broadly asserted their application.
Public policy is a general concept and arbitration cases often involve issues
connected to statutes, case law, regulations, and other legal standards."5 9 The loser

184. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
185. Id. at 766 (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948)).
186. Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
187. 484 U.S. 29 (1987),
188. Id. at43 (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
189. See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., District 17, 121 S. Ct.
462 (2000) (drug laws); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (drug laws);
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1995) (NASD regulations); Arizona Elec. Power
Coop., Inc. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1995) (lawyer's professional code of conduct); Brown v.
Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (11 th Cir. 1993) (state securities statute); Gulf Coast Indus.
Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993) (drug laws); Schoonmaker v. Cummings &
Lockwood of Connecticut, 747 A.2d 1017 (Conn. 2000) (lawyer's code of professional conduct); Town
of Groton v. United Steelworkers, 757 A.2d 501 (Conn. 2000) (criminal statute precluding
embezzlement); State of Minnesota v. Minnesota Ass'n of Prof'l Employees, 504 N.W.2d 751 (Minn.
1993) (criminal statute prohibiting embezzlement of state funds by public employees); Chicago Fire
App. Ct. 2000) (state law favoring
Fighters Union Local No. 2 v. City of Chicago, 735 N.E.2d 108 (111.
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of an arbitration award often alleges the arbitrator violated a public-policy that is
explicit, well defined, and dominant. Moreover, courts have often intervened where
they believe arbitrators have issued a decision contrary to judicial determination of
public policy.' 90
Federal appellate courts have taken two distinctly separate approaches in
determining whether they should vacate an arbitration award for violation of public
policy. Some courts review the merits of a particular arbitration award to determine
whether there is an explicit conflict with laws and legal precedents.' 9' This approach
causes significant court involvement in the arbitration process and a much greater
likelihood of a court's overturning an arbitration decision. Scrutinizing the
substance of arbitration decisions also encourages losing parties to seek judicial
review, thus undermining the finality of arbitral awards.' 92
The second approach by federal appellate courts in applying W.R. Grace and
Misco considers whether implementation of the arbitrator's award requires a party
to violate an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.' 93 To determine
whether vacatur for violation of public policy is appropriate under this standard, a
court need look only at the remedy-what the arbitrator orders the parties to
do-and not at the merits of the award. Courts following this approach engage in
a more limited review of arbitration awards.
State courts are likewise split over vacating arbitrations for violations of public
policy. Some favor a broader scrutiny of arbitration opinions to determine whether
the award implicates important public-policy concerns. 9 4 Others focus more

safe and effective fire protection services); County of DeWitt v. American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees Council 31,699 N.E.2d 163 (I1. App. Ct. 1998) (state law protecting the elderly from
abuse); City of Lynn v. Thompson, 737 N.E.2d 475 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (federal and state laws and
city regulations prohibiting unwarranted actions by police officer that results in serious injury to
members of the public); Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (child custody laws).
190. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Indus. Workers, 991 F.2d at 248 (vacating arbitration award reinstating
employee who tested positively for cocaine); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665,
670 (11 th Cir. 1988) (refusing to enforce arbitration award reinstating pilot who flew passenger plane
while intoxicated); Iowa Elec. Lt. & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424, 1426 (8th
Cir. 1987) (overtuming arbitral award reinstating machinist who deliberately violated federally mandated
safety regulations at nuclear power plant). See also Schooniaker, 747 A.2d at 1024 (stating that court
determines under de novo review whether arbitrator's decision violates public policy); Faherty v.
Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257, 1261 (N.J. 1984) (refusing to defer to arbitrator's award affecting child support
because of the court's nondelegable, special supervisory function in the area of child support that
warrants de novo review whenever an arbitrator's award of child support could adversely affect the best
interests of the child); cases cited infra note 193.
191. Agron, 49 F.3d 347; Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993); See
also cases cited supra note 151.
192. For a critique of this approach, see Hayford, A New Paradigm, supra note 181.
193. Brown, 994 F.2d 775; Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980);
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
194. See, e.g., Town of Groton, 757 A.2d at 508 (holding that arbitration award reinstating employee
violated the clear public policy against embezzlement and was properly vacated); State of Connecticut
v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees Council 4, 747 A.2d 480, 484 (Conn. 2000)
(concluding that arbitration award reinstating employee for admittedly making harassing phone calls to
a legislator which conduct violated state law should be overturned as a violation of clearly expressed
public policy); Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2, 735 N.E.2d at 118 (determining that
arbitrator's award reinstating discharged employees and rescinding suspensions of other employees who
participated in unauthorized retirement party at firehouse violated public policy favoring safe and

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss1/4

32

Heinsz: Heinsz: Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
200)1]

RUA.4: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying

narrowly on what the arbitrator orders and whether the remedy causes an act
contrary to an explicit statute, precedent or other law.' 95
The Drafting Committee decided against including public-policy violations as
an additional ground for vacatur in section 23(a).' 96 The judiciary, and not the
legislature, originated the public-policy ground to set aside arbitration awards based
on the common-law doctrine that courts will not enforce illegal agreements. The
evolving case law has been unsettled and conflicting. Thus, it would be difficult to
formulate specific, statutory language to guide parties concerning when public policy
should be a ground for vacatur.
Additionally, because violation of public policy is not an FAA ground for
vacatur, the Drafting Committee was concerned that if Congress should confirm only
the FAA's four present statutory grounds for vacatur, 197 addition of a public-policy
basis in state arbitration law could raise federal preemption concerns.'" Preemption
issues would also arise if the Supreme Court defines the law of vacatur for publicpolicy violations differently from that developed by a RUAA provision.'" The
Drafting Committee concluded that whether a court should vacate an arbitration
award for violation of public policy should remain a judicially developed doctrine.
The Drafting Committee reached a similar conclusion about vacating an
arbitrator's award for "manifest disregard of the law." Although the basis for this
doctrine also originated in the Supreme Court, it was rooted in dicta rather than

effective fire protection services); County of DeWitt, 699 N.E.2d at 165 (overturning arbitral award
reinstating nursing home employee who struck elderly patient as violation of public policy protecting
elderly from abuse or harm); City of Lynn, 737 N.E.2d at 480 (reversing decision of arbitrator reinstating
discharged police officer who had twice broken arms of citizens while taking them into custody).
195. See, e.g., Minnesota Ass'n of Prof'! Employees, 504 N.W.2d at 755 (finding that although
employee who was discharged for filing false expense report appeared to violate well-defined and
dominant public policy, arbitrator's reinstatement order did not violate any public policy); Ralston v.
City of Dahlonega, 512 S.E.2d 300, 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that arbitrator's remedy that
requires city to pay an award which includes a punitive damage amount does not violate public policy).
196. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments. supra note 6, at Official Comment C to R.U.A.A. § 24.
197. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
198. See supra Part i.A.
199. As noted previously, NCCUSL passed the RUAA on August 3, 2000. See supra Part 1. On
November 28,2000, the Supreme Court decided Eastern Associated Coal, 121 S. Ct. 462, in which the
Court again applied the public-policy doctrine. The Court, similar to its decisions in W.R. Grace and
Misco, upheld an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee found to have violated an employer's drug
policy despite the employer's claim that the award was contrary to public policy. Although the Court
reiterated the narrowness of the standard for setting aside arbitration awards for public-policy reasons,
the Court stated that "the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration
award itself violates positive law." Id. at 467. The Court determined that an arbitrator's award becomes
part of the collective-bargaining agreement and should be reviewed as a contractual provision to see
whether it runs counter to public policy. The opinion seems to follow the first approach noted above that
courts will look at the merits of an arbitrator's decision in determining whether the arbitral award
violates public policy. Id. at 466.
This standard disturbed Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion, because
he found it "hard to imagine how an arbitration award could violate a public policy.., without actually
conflicting with positive law." Id. at 470. He believed that the majority's opinion would simply cause
further litigation to determine whether in a particular case there is a violation of public policy. It is fair
to say that the contours of the Supreme Court's standard on the public-policy exception remain
uncertain.
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holding.2° Subsequent federal and state courts have concluded that a party's mere
showing that the result of an arbitration was incorrect or was not in accord with
applicable rules of law is insufficient to demonstrate the prerequisites necessary for
the manifest-disregard standard. 20 ' The claimant must establish two criteria. First,
the arbitration award must clearly violate controlling law. On its face the award
must indicate a serious misapplication of the law that amounts to an improper act by
the arbitrator. Second, the arbitrator must have known the law but consciously
decided not to follow it.2" 2 This ground requires a court to evaluate the arbitrator's
subjective understanding of the controlling legal principle and of its applicability to
the case.20 3 Losing parties often cite the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law,
but courts rarely apply it to overturn arbitration decisions. 2°4 Because arbitration
awards often involve legal ground, too loose an application of the manifest-disregard
doctrine could result in courts becoming enmeshed in reviewing the merits of
arbitrator decisions.
The Drafting Committee decided not to include a "manifest disregard of the
law" ground in20section
23(a) for reasons similar to its determination regarding
"public policy." 5 It is uncertain how courts will develop the manifest-disregard
doctrine. If the RUAA had included a provision to vacate awards for manifest
disregard and Congress or the Supreme Court eventually defines this ground in a

200. In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruledon othergrounds, and Rodriguez de
Quijas, 490 U.S. 477, the Court stated in dicta:
While it may be true ... that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions
of the [relevant law] would constitute ground for vacating the award pursuant to section 10[a] of the
Federal Arbitration Act, that failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted
submissions [to arbitration] ... the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest
disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
See also FirstOptions, 514 U.S. at 942 (noting in dicta that "parties [are] bound by arbitrator's decision
not in manifest disregard of the law").
201. Greenberg, 220 F.3d 22; Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Cigna
Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456
(1 th Cir. 1997); Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l, 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1989); O.R. Secs., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742 (11 th Cir. 1988); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986); Hunter, Keith Indus. v. Piper
Capital Mgt. Inc., 575 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1998); May v. First Nat'l Pawn Brokers, Ltd., 887 P.2d 185
(Mont. 1994); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996); Ralston, 512
S.E.2d 300; Harris v. Bennett, 503 S.E.2d 782 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
202. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234,239 (1 st Cir. 1995) (holding that "arbitration
awards are subject to review where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable
law-and then ignored it"); Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that
"[m]anifest disregard of the law exists when the arbitrator commits an error that was 'obvious and
capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.
...[and when] the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides
to ignore or pay no attention to it"') (citing Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933); San Martine Compania de
Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (Haw. Ct. App. 1961) (concluding that "a
manifest disregard of the law in the context of the language used in Wilko v. Swan might be present when
arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same").
203. See Hayford, A New Paradigm,supranote 181, at 468.
204. See cases cited supra notes 191-202. In none of these cases did persons challenging the
arbitration award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law prevail. For a case in which a claimant
did succeed in showing that an arbitration award violated the standard of manifest disregard, see Neary
v. PrudentialIns. Co. of Am., 63 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Conn. 1999).
205. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment C to R.U.A.A. § 24.
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different way, serious federal preemption problems would arise. Moreover, it is
difficult to formulate a bright-line test for vacatur based on manifest disregard of the
law because of its objective and subjective elements. The Drafting Committee also
was concerned that codification of the manifest-disregard standard would encourage
appeals of arbitration awards to the courts on this ground, thus impairing the finality
of arbitral awards.
The issue of manifest disregard was a topic of debate at the NCCUSL 2000
annual meeting during the final reading of the RUAA. The Committee of the Whole
of NCCUSL endorsed the Drafting Committee position and voted to reject an
amendment proposed by a Commissioner from the floor to incorporate manifest
disregard as a basis for vacating arbitration awards.2°
Although NCCUSL and the Drafting Committee did not include in section 23(a)
provisions for "opt-in" review for errors of law, internal appellate arbitral review,
public policy, or manifest disregard of the law, 207 the RUAA does not prohibit parties
from challenging the legality of awards on one or more of these grounds. Because
these bases for vacating arbitral awards have traditionally been nonstatutory, courts
may still use these standards in appropriate cases. By limiting the provisions of
vacatur essentially to the narrow grounds presently in the UAA and FAA,208 the
RUAA preserves the integrity of the arbitration process and the finality of awards.
F. Attorney's Fees and Finalityof Award
A major concern of the Drafting Committee was the increasing court challenges
that losing parties make to arbitration awards. One of the strengths of arbitration is
the finality it brings to the resolution of a dispute. 20 9 This is a primary reason why
the UAA, FAA, and RUAA2"' state very limited grounds on which a person may file
an action to vacate or modify an arbitrator's decision. Often parties include clauses
in their arbitration agreements that the decision of the arbitrator will be "final and
binding. ''2: I These clauses underscore the intent that when persons agree to arbitrate,
they seek this means of decision making rather than other methods, particularly
litigation.
If one party subsequently challenges an arbitrator's decision by moving to
vacate' 2 or modify2" an award, or by causing the other party to move to confirm214

206. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment C5 to R.U.A.A. § 24.
207. For further discussion of these issues regarding vacatur and the RUAA in this symposium, see
Hayford, supra note 31.
208. The RUAA adds only the additional ground of vacatur for improper notice of initiation of an
arbitration. See R.U.A.A. § 23(a)(6).
209. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofA lternative Dispute Resolution
and Public Civil Justice,47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1054-55 (2000) (noting that the finality of an arbitration
award is a benefit of the arbitration process which any unitary theory of public civil dispute resolution
must protect).
210. See U.A.A. § 12(a); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); R.U. A.A. § 23(a).
211. See Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration Process: A Primer
for Advocates, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463, 472 (1991).
212. R.U.A.A.§23.
213. Id.§ 24.
214. Id.§ 22.
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an award, the challenge undermines the conclusiveness the disputants intended to
give to the arbitration process. Indeed, a challenged arbitration award may cause
more cost and delay than if the parties had initially litigated the difference because
litigation over the arbitration award's validity is in addition to the arbitration itself.
As a result of the restrictive standards by which courts may review arbitration
awards, attacks on arbitration decisions are usually unsuccessful. 15 Indeed, some
persons may move to modify or vacate for reasons other than the merits of a
challenge. A disgruntled party may seek to delay implementation of the arbitrator's
award and to add to the cost of the winning party's claim by additional litigation.
The challenger both devalues the successful party's favorable result and clogs the
court system with vacatur or modification motions that have little chance of success.
Such spurious suits harm the public interest by adding to court dockets and by
delaying judicial resolution of more meritorious claims. In this way, dubious
challenges to arbitration awards have the exact opposite effect of one of the primary
purposes of arbitration, to channel disputes away from the court system.
As a result of these concerns regarding unwarranted assaults on arbitral
determinations, the Drafting Committee included section 25(c), which grants a court
discretion to award "reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of
litigation" to a prevailing party in any contested judicial proceeding to confirm,
vacate, or modify an arbitration award. 216 This provision should discourage
challenges to arbitration decisions except those with a significant likelihood of being
meritorious.
Because a court under section 25(c) may award attorney's fees to "a prevailing
party,"2 7' this provision's deterrent effect will not impact only the loser of an
arbitration case. Where an arbitrator has very likely made an error sufficient to
undermine the award, the winning party in the arbitration should have second
thoughts on whether to litigate an action to confirm the award or to defend against
a motion to vacate or modify filed by the loser because of possible liability to the
arbitration loser who may become the "prevailing party" in the litigation. Section
25(c) should cause both sides to weigh carefully the consequences before resorting
to litigation after arbitration.
However, section 25(c) is not intended to discourage close cases where the law
may be unclear, for example whether a nonstatutory standard such as "a violation of
public policy" or "a manifest disregard of the law" could apply.2"' Section 25(c) is
unlike section 14(e), which requires a court to award attorney's fees and costs of
litigation when someone unsuccessfully sues an arbitrator or arbitration
organization.2 ' 9 Rather section 25(c) gives a court discretion to decide whether to

215. MACNEIL TREATISE supra note 35, at IV § 40.13 ("[O1ver the years the courts have taken a fairly
uniform approach to awards: Awards should be confirmed and enforced unless there is clear evidence
of a gross impropriety."); JOHN S. MURRAY ET. AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE

OF LAWYERS 624 (2d ed. 1996) ("The conventional wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration
awards are rare.").
216. R.U.A.A. § 25(c).
217. Id.
218. See discussion supra of vacatur Part lI.E.
219. See discussion infra of awarding arbitrators and arbitration organizations attorney's fees and
costs of litigation Part III.B.
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add attorney's fees or other costs of litigation. The Drafting Committee in section
25(c) meant for a court to use its discretion, as it has under other statutes with similar
fee-shifting language, 220 to take into account equitable considerations. Where the
appropriateness of an arbitrator's decision is a close question or the public interest
is enhanced by making the law clearer in the area of vacatur, a court should not
hesitate to withhold attorney's fees and other costs if that would better serve the
interests of justice.
There is another special situation that the Drafting Committee considered
inappropriate for an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs even though a party
files a judicial action after an arbitration award. In some instances, a losing party in
an arbitration simply may not have the means to comply with the award, and the
winning party may want to convert the arbitral award into a judgment by an action
to confirm under section 22. Section 25(c) allows a court to impose attorney's fees
and costs only where the judicial proceeding is "contested." Thus, provided the
losing party does not resist the confirmation action, the court may not tack on
attorney's fees and costs of litigation.22'
Section 25(c) is a waivable provision under section 4.222 If the parties know at
the outset of an arbitration proceeding that the loser will likely appeal an award, they
may agree that a court under section 25(c) cannot award attorney's fees and costs in
a subsequent judicial action.
In adding section 25(c) to the RUAA, the Drafting Committee sought to
strengthen the conclusiveness of arbitration awards. In light of the high costs
associated with litigation that a court may award to the prevailing party under section
25(c), this provision should discourage parties from pursuing tenuous claims in postarbitral judicial proceedings. On the other hand, the statute gives a court leeway in
determining whether to assess attorney's fees and related costs when a party
appropriately challenges or defends an arbitration. Section 25(c) should be an
important feature that benefits the arbitration process by reinforcing the finality of
arbitral decisions.
G. Effective Date and Application ofAct
A final change worth noting is one that, although technical, is important. Many
arbitration agreements are included in contracts between parties who have a
longstanding or continuous relationship. For instance, a producer and a supplier may
work from a contract the basic terms of which do not change and which includes an
arbitration clause. An arbitral dispute might not arise until years after they entered
into their contract. If the parties drafted their agreement under the UAA but the
dispute did not arise until after the effective date a state passed the RUAA, they
likely would be bound to arbitrate under the provisions of the UAA 223 This

220. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 116); Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 191 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (Americans with
Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12205 (1994)).
221. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 4 to R.U.A.A. § 25.
222. R.U.A.A. § 4(a).
223. Typically, statutes are made effective prospectively only. See, e.g., U.A.A. § 20.
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approach creates two sets of laws that state courts and arbitrators would apply in
interpreting arbitration agreements-laws developed under the UAA for arbitration
agreements entered into prior to the effective date of the RUAA and laws under the
RUAA for arbitration agreements entered into afterwards. In contracts of long
duration duplicate legal rules would last a significant period of time.
To minimize the problem of applying the UAA to some arbitration disputes and
the RUAA to others, the Drafting Committee adopted an approach that would
effectively phase out the UAA.2 24 Section 31225 is a standard provision establishing
the RUAA's effective date and section 33226 is a savings clause that the RUAA will
not affect actions commenced or rights accrued before that date. However, these two
sections are subject to sections 3227 and 32.228 Section 3 not only requires that the
RUAA apply to arbitration agreements entered into after the effective date of the
statute, 22g but also gives parties to arbitration agreements that were entered into under
the UAA the option, if they all agree in a record,230 that the RUAA will govern their
arbitration agreement and arbitration proceeding. 3 Sections 3 and 32 also require
that a state set a "delayed" date when the UAA will be repealed23 2 and the RUAA
will control all arbitration agreements, including agreements entered into before the
new arbitration statute's effective date, i.e., under the UAA.
An illustration of these provisions is helpful to understand how they will work.
Assume a state legislature passes the RUAA and, in accordance with section 31,
makes the RUAA effective on January 1, 2005. In accordance with sections 3(c) and
32, the legislature chooses January 1, 2007,233 as the date by which all arbitration
agreements in the state must conform to the RUAA and on which the UAA will be
repealed. Under sections 3(a) and 31, the RUAA would cover any agreements
entered into after January 1, 2005. Under sections 3(b) and 33, between January 1,
2005, and December 31, 2006, the UAA would apply to arbitration agreements
entered into before January 1, 2005, unless all parties to the arbitration agreement
or proceedings agree in a record that the RUAA governs. Under sections 3(c) and
32 on January 1, 2007, the RUAA would apply to all arbitration agreements whether
parties entered into the arbitration agreement either before or after January 1, 2005,
the effective date of the RUAA.
This approach to the application of the RUAA to arbitration agreements not only
provides parties notice and a sufficient time in which to conform their arbitration

224. Section 3 of the RUAA is based upon the effective date and application provisions in the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (§ 1206) and the 1996 Amendments constituting the Uniform Limited Liability
Partnership Act of 1994 (§ 1210).
225. R.U.A.A.§ 31.
226. Id. § 33.
227. Id. § 3.
228. Id. § 32.
229. Id. § 3(a).
230. Id. § 1(6).
231. Id. § 3(b).
232. Id. §§ 3(c), 32.
233. Sections 3(c) and 32 refer to this date as the "delayed date." In the example January 1, 2007,
is the "delayed date."
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contracts to the new arbitration statute, but also insures uniform governance by
23 4a
single rule of law to arbitration agreements after a reasonable transition period.

III. CLARIFICATION
The RUAA addresses a number of issues not included in the UAA, although
some developed from case law under either the UAA or the FAA. In essence, the
RUAA codifies and makes uniform a number of arbitration law principles upon
which most state and federal courts have agreed. Additionally, the RUAA has
updated a number of UAA provisions to reflect modern practice. By eliminating
ambiguities and incorporating accepted practices, the RUAA should aid users of the
arbitration system to resolve their disputes more effectively and efficiently.
A. Arbitrability
In addition to restating a major tenet of the UAA-that courts must enforce
arbitration agreements2 5-section 6 ofthe RUAA specifies who determines whether
disputes are arbitrable. The RUAA follows the generally accepted rule in both state
and federal courts that unless the parties otherwise agree, courts decide issues of
substantive arbitrability. Such issues include whether there is a valid arbitration
agreement and whether it covers the parties' particular dispute. On the other hand,
matters involving procedural arbitrability, whether prerequisites such as time limits,
notice, laches, and the like, are for the arbitrator to decide. 36
Before a claim arises parties to an arbitration agreement cannot waive the
provision in section 6(a) making arbitration agreements legally enforceable,237 but
they may decide who will resolve issues of substantive and procedural arbitrability.
Section 4(a) recognizes the parties' autonomy to determine who will decide

234. Retroactive application of statutes to preexisting contracts is acceptable when the legislation has
a legitimate purpose and the measures are reasonable and appropriate to that end. 2 SUTHERLAND STAT.
CONST. § 41.07 (5th ed. 1993). The need for uniform application of arbitration laws and to avoid two
sets of rules governing arbitration agreements that are of a long-term duration are legitimate rationales
for retroactive application, especially because parties will be given a time period in which to determine
whether to opt for coverage under the UAA or the RUAA and during which to adjust any provisions in
their arbitration agreements for eventual application of the RUAA.
235. "An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent
controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except
upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract." R.U.A.A. § 6(a). See also
U.A.A. § 1; 9 U.S.C. § 2.
236. See First Options, 514 U.S. 938; Des Moines Asphalt & Paving Co. v. Colcon Ind., 500 N.W.2d
70, 72 (Iowa 1993), overruled by Wesley Retirement Servs. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, 594 N.W.2d 22
(Iowa 1999); Exber, 558 P.2d 517; State v. Stremick Constr. Co., 370 N.W.2d 730, 735 (N.D. 1985);
City of Cottonwood v. James L. Fann Contracting, Inc. 877 P.2d 284, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994);
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 900 v. Suburban Bus Div., 634 N.E.2d 469,474 (111. App. Ct. 1994);
City of Morris v. Duininck Bros., 531 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Gaines v. Financial
Planning Consultants, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). But see Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that under New York arbitration
law a court rather than an arbitrator decides whether a statute of limitations time bars an arbitration).
237. R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(I).
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jurisdictional issues in their arbitration disputes.23 ' For instance, although the general
rule in section 6(b) is that the court decides substantive arbitrability, the parties may
agree that the arbitrator shall make this determination. Arbitration organizations,
such as the American Arbitration Association and the International Chamber of
Commerce, provide that arbitrators rather than courts make the initial determination
of substantive arbitrability.239 The RUAA allows this approach that arbitrators
decide their own jurisdiction.
The language in section 6(c) of the RUAA stating that the arbitrator decides
"whether a contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable" 40 was
intended to incorporate the "separability" doctrine decided by the United States
Supreme Court under the FAA in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.24 The Court concluded that the defense of fraud in the
inducement of a contract went to the validity of the entire agreement and not just to
the arbitration clause. Because the parties had agreed that disputes concerning
interpretation of the contract were for the arbitrator, the Court determined that it was
appropriate for the arbitrator and not the court to decide this claim even though a
favorable ruling on the defense would void the entire contract, including the
arbitration clause. The Court held that the arbitration clause was separable from the
rest of the contract for purposes of ruling on defenses to the validity of the contract
as a whole. Thus, if a disputed issue is within the scope of the arbitration clause, the
arbitrator, and not the court, decides challenges to the enforceability of the
underlying contract on grounds such as fraud, illegality, unconscionability and the
like.

238. Id. § 4(a).
239. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedure R-8(b), at
http://www.adr.org (last visited May 16,2001); International Chamber of Commerce International Court
of Arbitration, Rule of Arbitration, art. 19, at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules
(January 1998). See also Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469,473 (Ist Cir. 1989) (finding that
when parties agreed that all disputes arising out of or in connection with distributorship agreement would
be settled by binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce, they agreed to submit issues of substantive arbitrability to arbitrator); Daiei v. United
States Shoe Corp., 755 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Haw. 1991) (noting that parties agreed to submit issues of
substantive arbitrability to arbitrator, when they incorporated by reference in their arbitration agreement
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce providing that "any decision as to the arbitrator's
jurisdiction shall lie with the arbitrator").
240. R.U.A.A. § 6(c).

241. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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Most states have followed the "separability" doctrine, but some have not.242 The
Drafting Committee concluded that the view of the United States Supreme Court and
the majority of state courts concerning the separability doctrine should be
incorporated into the RUAA.243 If parties agree that an arbitrator should decide all
differences under a contract, they have bargained for the arbitrator, not the courts,
to resolve the merits of their dispute. For a court to review the parties' substantive
positions under the guise of deciding whether to enforce the arbitration agreement
runs counter to the accord the parties struck when they determined that arbitration,
not litigation, would be the means to settle contractual disagreements. Thus, section
6(c) provides that the arbitrator decides "whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. 244
The separability doctrine does not apply when a party challenges only the
propriety of the arbitration clause itself on the grounds of fraud or illegality, and the
court then properly determines only the validity of the arbitration agreement. 24' A
court rightly decides whether the parties intended arbitration to apply to their dispute
because voluntary agreement is at the heart of the arbitration process. If a court
positively concludes on the narrow issue of substantive arbitrability that the
arbitration provision is valid and the parties' claims are subject to that clause, the
court has completed its task. Then, by the parties' agreement, the arbitrator makes
all further decisions on the merits of contractual claims and defenses to the
underlying agreement.

242. A majority of states recognize some form of the separability doctrine under their state arbitration
laws. See New Process Steel Corp. v. Titan Indus. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (applying
Texas law); Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1979)(applying
Pennsylvania law); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. 1994); Erickson, Arbuthnot,
McCarthy, Keamey & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1983); Hercules & Co. v.
Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916 (D.C. 1992); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 921 P.2d 146 (Haw.
1996); Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 1980); Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d
42 (N.Y. 1973); Jackson Mills, Inc. v. BT Capital Corp., 440 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1994); South Carolina
Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great Western Coal (Kentucky), Inc., 437 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1993); U.S. Insulation,
Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co., 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Weiss v. Voice/Fax Corp., 640 N.E.2d 875
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Gerwell v. Moran, 10 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App. 1999); Pinkis v. Network Cinema
Corp., 512 P.2d 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). See also William W. Park, Determining Arbitral
Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators,8 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 133, 143
(1997) ("[T]he separability doctrine permits arbitrators toinvalidate the main contract... without the
risk that their decisions will call into question the validity of the arbitration clause from which they
derive their power. In other words, the separability doctrine gives arbitrators the tools with which to do
their job, by examining fully the parties' agreement.").
Other states have either limited or declined to follow the Prima Paintdoctrine on separability. See
Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 197 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1972); Shaw 698 P.2d 880, 881-82;
Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910,916 (Okla. 1996) (recognizing that majority of states apply the doctrine
of separability but declining to follow the doctrine); Frizzell Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d
79 (Tenn. 1999); Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061 (Cal. 1996); Goebel v.
Blocks & Marbles Brand Toys, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); City of Wamego v. L.R. Foy
Constr. Co., 675 P.2d 912 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp.,
376 So. 2d 1040 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Holmes v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 633 A.2d 932 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993).
243. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 4 to R.U.A.A. § 6.
244. R.U.A.A. § 6(c).
245. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395.
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The separability doctrine is waivable.246 The parties may agree that a court shall
decide issues such as fraud in the inducement or other claims of illegality concerning
the contract. In the absence of such an agreement, the general rule embodied in
section 6(c)14 7applies that the arbitrator will determine the validity of the underlying
contract.
B. Arbitral Immunity
Section 14(a) restates the well-established rule that arbitrators are immune from
civil liability when acting in their arbitral capacity. 4 This doctrine tracks the
immunity that courts provided judges early on to insure their independence and
protect them in their decision-making process from unwarranted challenges by
disgruntled parties. Because of the functional comparability of the role of arbitrators
to that of judges, courts concluded that arbitrators should also be protected by the
immunity principle. The RUAA codifies this immunity principle.249

246. R.U.A.A. § 4(a). Allowing the parties to waive or vary the provision of the RUAA applies to
§ 6(c).
247. Id. § 6(c).
248. See Auster v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
-[b]ased primarily on the 'functional comparability' of the arbitrator's role in a contractually agreed
upon arbitration proceeding to that ofhisjudicial counterpart, the Courts of Appeals that have addressed
the issue have uniformly immunized arbitrators from civil liability for all acts performed in their arbitral
capacity"); Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987) ("While the [Federal
Arbitration] Act does not so provide, case law dictates that arbitrators are immune from civil liability
for acts within their jurisdiction arising out of their arbitral functions in contractually agreed upon
arbitration hearings .... [Tihe functional comparability of the arbitrators' decision-making process and
judgments to those ofjudges... generates the same need for independent judgment free from the threat
oflawsuits."); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. and
Its Locals 656 and 985 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
an arbitrator is "functionally comparable to a judge and, consequently, he is clothed with an immunity
that is analogous to judicial immunity"); Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (6th
Cir. 1982) (listing circuits that have found that arbitrators are functionally comparable to judges and
should thus be afforded immunity); Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.
S.C. 1957) (disallowing party to require arbitrators to testify in an attempt to impeach arbitration award);
Boraks v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 517 NW.2d 771, 772 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the
functional comparability of arbitrators is "well established").
Four states presently provide some form of arbitral immunity in their arbitration statutes: CAL. CiV.
PROC. CODE § 1297.119; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.107 (West 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37.1 (1995);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-4 (1994).
249. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978) (establishing the principle that the
extension of judicial-like immunity to non-judicial officials is properly based on the "functional
comparability" of the individual's acts and judgments to the acts and judgments of judges). See also
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993) (holding that the key to the extension
ofjudicial immunity to non-judicial officials is the "performance of the function of resolving disputes
between parties or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights"); Austern, 898 F.2d at 886 (affirming
dismissal of claim against arbitration organization and stating that "[biased primarily on the 'function
comparability' of the arbitrator's role in a contractually agreed upon arbitration proceeding to that of his
judicial counterpart, the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have uniformly immunized
arbitrators from civil liability for all acts performed in their arbitral capacity"); Wasyl, 813 F.2d at 1581
(determining that "arbitrators are immune from civil liability for acts within theirjurisdiction arising out
of their arbitral functions in contractually agreed upon arbitration hearings"); Greyhound, 701 F.2d at
1185 (finding that an arbitrator's "purpose is 'functionally comparable' to a judge and, consequently,
he is clothed with an immunity that is analogous to judicial immunity"); Corey, 691 F.2d at 1208-09
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The Drafting Committee members debated whether to provide the same arbitral
immunity to arbitration organizations. Some argued that because such organizations
perform only ministerial acts, persons should be able to hold these organizations
liable for negligence. A majority of the Drafting Committee concluded that neutral
arbitration organizations, like arbitrators, discharge duties in administering the
arbitration process that are the functional equivalent of the duties of judges
administering the adjudication process. Case law provides judicial immunity to
administrative personnel in the court system when they engage in acts of a judicial
nature.250 Likewise, substantial precedent holds arbitration organizations immune
from civil liability when performing duties in administering the arbitration
process.2"' The Drafting Committee voted to include arbitration providers in the
immunity section "to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a
judicial capacity.' ' 2
The RUAA intends that the immunity granted to arbitrators and arbitration
organizations is comprehensive to insure full freedom in making decisions involving
an arbitration case without concern for potential liability. Section 14(b) provides
that the RUAA immunity supplements any other immunity granted by judicial
decisions or other statutes.253
Despite the broad arbitral-immunity doctrine, the Drafting Committee was
concerned that disaffected parties, either for lack of knowledge about the immunity
doctrine or for intimidation or other improper purposes, still would file lawsuits
against arbitrators and arbitration organizations. Many cases demonstrate parties'
willingness to attack the outcome of an arbitration by filing suit against the arbitrator

(stating that based upon the policies ofjudicial and quasi-judicial immunity such immunity would be
applied to arbitrators); Boraks, 517 N.W.2d at 772 (noting that "[iut is well established that, for reasons
of public policy, arbitrators are protected from civil suit by the doctrine of arbitral immunity"); Richard
J.Mattera, Note, Has the Expansion ofArbitral Immunity ReachedIts Limits After United States v. City
of Hayward?, 12 OHIO ST. J.ON DiSP. RESOL. 779 (1997) (discussing the history, development, and
future of arbitral immunity); 4 AM. JUR. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 172 (1995) (discussing
judicial immunity for arbitrators).
250. See, e.g., Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of claim
against judicial clerks, stating that although clerks are not entitled to immunity for ministerial functions,
they are entitled to immunity for acts that are "an integral part of the judicial process"); Olivia v. Heller,
839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of claim against judicial clerk, stating "courts have
granted absolute immunity to court clerks when they were performing discretionary acts of ajudicial
nature"); Fariello v. Campbell, 860 F. Supp. 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting summary judgment on claim
against the chief clerk of the court and a judicial clerk on the basis of immunity).
251. See New England Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 199 F.3d 542 (1st Cir.
1999); Honn v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 182 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 1999); Hawkins v. National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 149 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1998); Olson v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
85 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1996); Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248 (9th
Cir. 1973); Cort v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F.Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Boraks, 517 N.W.2d
771; Candor Central Sch. Dist. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 411 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
252. R.U.A.A. § 14(a). The Drafting Committee saw little difference in an arbitrator making
decisions, such as the location or time of the hearing or determining when briefs will be filed, and the
personnel of arbitration organizations deciding these issues.
However, because of the definition of arbitration organization, only a "neutral" arbitration
organization is entitled to immunity under section 14. R.U.A.A. § 1(1). See also 2000 Styled Act with
Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment I to R.U.A.A. § I.
253. R.U.A.A. § 14(b).
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or arbitration organization.254 Arbitrators and arbitration organizations are
eventually exonerated,"' but such actions, often frivolous, deter and hinder the
arbitration process. The RUAA protects arbitrators and arbitral organizations from
such actions by making them or their representatives incompetent to testify in a
judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding unless either the arbitrator or
arbitration provider is making a claim or a party proves that the arbitrator, arbitration
organization, or representative has engaged in wrongdoing that would vacate an
arbitration award. 5 6 Further, in any action in which a court concludes that the
arbitrator or arbitration organization or its representatives were either immune from
civil liability or incompetent to testify, the court "shall" award them attorney's fees
and other reasonable expenses of litigation. 5 7 Through these two provisions
protecting arbitrators and arbitration organizations from testifying in most actions
and requiring an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs, the RUAA insures the
independence of arbitrators and arbitration organizations and furthers the integrity
of the arbitral system.

254. See notes supra 248-250 and infra note 255.
255. See. e.g., New England Cleaning Servs., 199 F.3d at 543 (affirming dismissal on basis of arbitral
immunity); Honn, 182 F.3d at 1018 (affirming dismissal on basis of arbitral immunity); Hawkins, 149
F.3d at 332 (affirming defendant's motion for summary judgment because of immunity); Austern, 898
F.2d at 887 (affirming dismissal of complaint against arbitration sponsor on the basis of immunity);
Wasyl, 813 F.2d at 1583 (affirming summary judgment for immunity); Corey, 691 F.2d at 1213 (same).
256. RUAA § 14(d), which is based on the California Evidence Code providing that arbitrators shall
not be "competent to testify ... as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling occurring at or in
conjunction with the prior proceeding." CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5. See also N.J.R. SUPER. CT. R.
4:21A-4 (2001); N.Y. CT. R. § 28.12 (2001).
The exception requiring an arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization to testify where
a party claims vacatur on grounds of fraud, evident partiality, or other misconduct under section 23(a)(I )
or (2) is intended to be a very limited one. A court should not require the arbitrator or representative of
the arbitration organization to testify when a party merely asserts one of these grounds for vacatur;
rather, the person must make a "prima facie" showing that the arbitrator or representative of the
arbitration organization has committed the wrongdoing. See. e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n., Int'l, 385 F. Supp. 634, 640 (D.D.C. 1974) (describing "the arbitrator as ajudge, .. . and
therefore it is [not] appropriate to probe his decisional processes" and thus refusing to require testimony
by the arbitrator); Granting, 151 F. Supp. at 861-62 (disallowing party to require arbitrators to testify
without making a showing of wrongdoing on part of arbitrators in an attempt to impeach arbitration
award); Martin Weiner Co. v. Fred Freund Co., 155 N.Y.S.2d 802,805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (reasoning
that allowing arbitrator to testify concerning his or her intent would disturb the finality ofarbitration and
thus not allowing arbitrator testimony as to the propriety of award). See also Reuben I. Friedman,
Annotation, Admissibility of Affidavit or Testimony of Arbitrator to Impeach or Explain Award, 80
A.L.R.3d 155 (discussing general rule that arbitrators' testimony is inadmissible for use in subsequent
litigation regarding the propriety of arbitration awards, and examining specific situations like fraud in
which those claims often arise). Cf Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors Inc. v. Gunter, 230 S.E.2d
380, 388 (N.C. 1976) (holding that where there is objective basis to believe that arbitrator misconduct
has occurred, deposition of the arbitrator may be permitted and the deposition admitted in action for
vacatur). If a party unsuccessfully attempts to subpoena or otherwise require testimony from the
arbitrator or representative of the arbitration organization, then the requirement for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation in section 14(e) applies.
257. R.U.A.A. § 14(e).
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C. The Arbitration Process

Section 15 gives arbitrators wide latitude, subject to the parties' agreement, to
conduct an arbitration "in such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a
fair and expeditious disposition of the proceeding."258 The section clarifies
arbitrators' ability to hold pre-hearing conferences to resolve matters such as
scheduling, disputed issues, discovery and the like.259 Arbitrators maintain discretion
concerning the admissibility and weight of evidence, but this section preserves
parties' rights to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at any hearing.2 6
The Drafting Committee debated and changed its mind by a split vote on
whether to allow arbitrators to make summary disposition of a case.261 The UAA has
no provision on this matter. Some courts have upheld arbitrators deciding matters
in summary proceedings, but others have cast doubt on such action. 262 One reason
for the uncertainty is that a ground on which a court may vacate an award is where
an arbitrator fails to "consider evidence material to the controversy. '263 Drafting
Committee members argued that without a hearing, an arbitrator could not properly
consider the evidence in controversy. Some on the Drafting Committee also asserted
that because arbitration is a more informal process than litigation, parties expect and
should have a right to a hearing. A majority of the Drafting Committee concluded
that the arbitration process, which in some cases involves extremely complex issues
and may become very expensive, should include the means to resolve issues or an
entire case by summary disposition. However, the statute requires that before an
arbitrator may summarily decide a case, the moving party must provide the other
party with sufficient notice and a "reasonable opportunity to respond." 2' 6
Because section 15 is a waivable provision,2 61 parties may shape the type of
arbitration process that best suits their needs, whether it be an expedited one or a
procedure involving all of the formality and discovery rights of litigation. Absent
such agreement, section 15 gives the arbitrator wide discretion to conduct the

258. Id. § 15.
259. Id. § 15(a).
260. Id. §§ 15(a), (c), (d).
261. See February1999 Draft, supra note 6, at Reporter Notes 5 & 8 to Draft R.U.A.A. § 1 (b) at
xx (noting 4-3 vote to delete provision on summary disposition but then a 5-1 vote to add a provision
on summary disposition).
262. Intercarbon Bermuda, Ltd. v. Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64, 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (confirming a summary adjudication by an arbitrator based on documentary evidence but
expressing reservations about deciding arbitration cases without an evidentiary hearing); Schlessinger,
47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660-61 (upholding arbitrator's award based on a summary adjudication but cautioning
that the appropriateness of such summary action depends upon whether the party opposing a summary
motion is given a fair opportunity to present its position); Stifler v. Seymour Weiner, 488 A.2d 192, 195
(Md. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that dispositive motion is appropriate on issue of statute of limitations);
Pegasus Constr. Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 929 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
full hearing of all evidence regarding merits of a claim is unnecessary where decision may be made on
basis of motion to dismiss). But see Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1418 (N.D. Okla.
1996) (vacating arbitration award and finding that the arbitration panel was guilty of misconduct and
exceeded its powers in refusing to hear pertinent evidence by deciding case without a hearing).
263. R.U.A.A. § 23(a)(3).
264. Id. § 15(b)(2).
265. Id. § 4(a).
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arbitration with the paramount goal of insuring a fair but expeditious proceeding.
In this way. section 15 honors the goals of party autonomy, efficiency and
fundamental fairness.
D. Discovery
In a sense, discovery was the battleground over the future of arbitration:
whether arbitration would become merely a litigation surrogate or remain a viable
substitute for the judicial process. The primary issue was one of cost and delay
versus fairness. The matter of discovery was as difficult for the Drafting Committee
to resolve as it has been for others involved in the arbitration process. The expense
and delay that discovery entails in today's litigation is antithetical to arbitration's
valuable benefits of relative speed, informality, and less expense. Indeed, some
courts, noting these policy reasons underlying arbitration and that the UAA makes
no provision for discovery, have concluded that "pretrial discovery is not available
under our present statutes for arbitration. '' 6
On the other hand, the need for information before an arbitration hearing,
especially in complex cases, may be as critical as in litigation. Evidence presented
to the Drafting Committee overwhelmingly demonstrated that in many fields of
arbitration, discovery has become a fact of life. The Drafting Committee had two
key elements to determine: who decides whether to allow discovery and, if
discovery is allowed, what standard governs concerning the extent of discovery that
may be had. During the first reading of the RUAA in 1999 before the Uniform Law
Commissioners, a Commissioner made an impassioned plea simply to apply to the
arbitration process the discovery rules developed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In other words, parties and their advocates would control when and how
much discovery may be had, and the standard would be the broad one allowing
discovery of any "relevant" matter or "information... reasonably calculated to lead
'
to the discovery of admissible evidence."267
Both the Drafting Committee and
NCCUSL rejected this approach.
In an attempt to balance the necessity of pre-hearing discovery in some cases
with the desire to maintain the positive benefits of arbitration, the Drafting
Committee (1) placed control of discovery in the hands of the arbitrator and not the
parties and (2) established a standard that limited both the availability and extent of
discovery. The Drafting Committee intended that the full panoply of discovery
mechanisms under modem rules of civil procedure would normally not be

266. Rippe v. West Am. Ins. Co., No. 353954, 1993 WL 512547 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 1993).
See also Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that party to arbitration contract had
no right to pre-hearing discovery).
267. See FED. R.CIv. P. 26(b)(1); JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02
(3d ed. 1999) (noting the broad standard of Rule 26, and recognizing that there is a general "perception
that parties abuse the discovery tools" in using that rule); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that the underlying philosophy of the discovery
rules "was that prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all relevant
information in the possession of any person, unless the information is privileged ....The scope of
discovery was broadened and the restrictions imposed upon it were directed chiefly at the use of, rather
than the acquisition of. the information discovered, although concerns about cost have risen to
prominence in recent years.").
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appropriate for arbitration unless the parties specifically incorporate them into their
arbitration agreement.
The Drafting Committee conveyed this intent in section 17, which deals with
269
discovery. 68 First, the RUAA makes the discovery provisions waivable, so parties
may either eliminate discovery or craft their own rules for exchanging information
that best suits their needs. Second, in the absence of agreement, section 17(c) grants
the arbitrator discretion whether and to what extent to allow discovery. Thus, the
Drafting Committee rejected proposals that section 17(c) should vest discretion in
the parties or their attorneys to determine discovery, which is essentially what occurs
in civil litigation. 27' Finally, the standard by which arbitrators determine discovery
is very much in line with both arbitration's underlying purpose as a more informal
means of dispute resolution than litigation and the parties' needs in particular cases
for pre-hearing information and evidence. The arbitrator is to permit only such
discovery as is appropriate after "taking into account the needs of the parties to the
arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of making the
proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective."27' The Comments to section 17
underscore the more limited nature of discovery in arbitration and that arbitration is
a form of dispute resolution different from traditional litigation.272
The RUAA resolves the difficult issue of arbitral discovery by recognizing the
parties' autonomy to agree to the type of system for exchanging information best
suited to their needs, whether this is to eliminate discovery, keep it to a minimum,
or provide the same or greater means of discovery than allowed in the judicial
system. However, the default provision places responsibility for discovery clearly
within the discretion of the arbitrator, who likely will keep this process to a
minimum. Thus, the RUAA has adapted discovery to the evolving practice of
arbitration while maintaining the identity of arbitration as separate and distinct from
litigation.
Another difficult discovery issue arises when parties determine that they need
information from an outsider to the arbitral dispute. Section 17 retains arbitrators'
present UAA authority to issue subpoenas for attendance of witnesses or production
273
In
of documents at the hearing and for depositions of unavailable witnesses.

268. See R.U.A.A. § 17(c)-(f).
269. Id. § 4(a).
270. Most courts have allowed discovery only at the discretion of the arbitrator. See, e.g., Stanton
v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Transwestem Pipeline Co.
v. J.E. Blackburn, 831 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App. 1992). The few state arbitration statutes that have
addressed the matter of discovery also leave these issues to the discretion of the arbitrator: MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 251, § 7(e) (West 2000) (stating that only the arbitrators may enforce a request for
production of documents and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 171.007(b) (West 2000) (providing that arbitrator may allow deposition of adverse
witness for discovery purposes); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-8 (2000) (allowing arbitrators to order
discovery in their discretion).
271. R.U.A.A. § 17(c).
272. See 2000 Styled Act with Comments, supra note 6, at Official Comment 3 to R.U.A.A. § 17:
"[T]he default standard of section 17(c) is meant to discourage most forms of discovery in arbitration."
273. R.U.A.A. § 17(a), (b); U.A.A. § 7(a), (b). The parties cannot waive RUAA § 17(a) and (b)
before a claim arises. See R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(1).
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addition, section 17 now grants arbitrators authority to issue subpoenas for prehearing discovery proceedings such as depositions. 74
An important discovery matter concerns the arbitrator's authority to issue
subpoenas to nonparties to testify or produce information at a hearing or during
discovery. The recent holding of the Fourth Circuit in COMSATCorp. v. National
Science Foundation275 underscores the significance of this issue. COMSA T
concluded that under the FAA,276 whose language is similar to that in the UAA,277
arbitrators do not have authority to issue subpoenas to nonparties to produce
materials before an arbitration hearing. The court determined that the FAA allows
parties only limited discovery in arbitration and that, absent a showing of special
need, a party has no right to subpoena documents from outsiders.7 8
Despite the COMSAT holding, numerous other courts have determined that
arbitrators under the FAA and UAA may issue orders such as subpoenas to third
parties both to attend arbitration hearings and to give testimony or produce
information prior to an arbitration.2 79 These decisions recognize that as in a court or
administrative proceeding, a party to an arbitration often needs knowledge or
testimony from a nonparty to prove or defend against a claim. Section 17 follows
this line of decisions granting arbitrators discretion to compel third persons to testify
or give information to insure that parties will receive a just hearing.

274. R.U.A.A. § 17(d).
275. 190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999).
276. "The arbitrators... may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as
a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which
may be deemed material as evidence in the case. " 9 U.S.C. § 7.
277. "The arbitrators may issue.., subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production
of books, records, documents and other evidence, and shall have the power to administer oaths." U.A.A.
§ 7(a).
278. See also Burton, 614 F.2d at 391 (holding that under the FAA a party only upon a showing of
special need or hardship may petition a district court to compel pre-arbitration discovery); Integrity Ins.
Co. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (finding that arbitrator lacks
authority to compel nonparty witness to appear for depositions prior to arbitration hearing, as witnesses
who are not parties to arbitration agreement "never bargained for or voluntarily agreed to participate in
an arbitration").
279. Inre Brazell, No. M-82 AGS, 2000 WL 364997 (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 2000) (concluding that case
law supports arbitrator's authority to require pre-hearing production of documents from third parties);
Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 880 (N.D. III. 1995) (holding
that arbitrator had the power under FAA to subpoena a third party to produce documents and to testify
at a deposition); Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (M.D. Tenn. 1994)
(stating that under "[t]he power of the panel to compel production of documents from third-parties for
the purposes ofa hearing implicitly authorizes the lesser power to compel such documents for arbitration
purposes prior to a hearing"); Stanton, 685 F. Supp. at 1242-43 (upholding subpoena issued by arbitrator
under FAA that nonparties must appear at prehearing conference and arbitration hearing); Drivers Local
Union No. 639 v. Seagram Sales Corp., 531 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating that "the Uniform
Arbitration Act provides for the issuance of subpoenas by an arbitrator to non-party witnesses at an
arbitration proceeding, to compel their testimony or the production of documents"); United Elec.
Workers Local 893 v. Schmitz, 576 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998) (holding that Iowa Arbitration Act confers
on arbitrators the power to subpoena nonparty witnesses). See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 844 (1994) (finding that although the FAA "can be
read" as only authorizing arbitrators to require witnesses to attend arbitral hearings, "[I]ower courts have
not, however, construed § 7 in this fashion").
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On its face, section 17(a) allows an arbitrator to issue a subpoena for the
attendance of"a witness"28 at any hearing, and 17(b) is even more explicit that an
'28
arbitrator may permit a deposition of "any witness" ' to be used as evidence at an
arbitration hearing. Similarly, section 17(c) states that when deciding whether or
how much discovery to permit, an arbitrator must take into account the needs not
25 2
These
only of the parties to the hearing but also of "other affected persons.
than
more
encompasses
the
statute
that
references to nonparties in section 17 indicate
parties concerning arbitral subpoenas and discovery. The Comments to section 17
make clear that the Drafting Committee intended an arbitrator to have the power to
subpoena testimony and information from third parties in appropriate
circumstances.283
The statute also provides safeguards so that interference with nonparties will be
as little as possible. Section 17(b) permits a non-party witness to request the
arbitrator to allow the witness to testify at the hearing by deposition rather than by
appearance at the arbitration itself.2" 4 A third party may also request a protective
order from an arbitrator to insure that privileged information, confidential data, trade
8 5
secrets, and similar information not be disclosed as if the matter were in litigation.
Orders by arbitrators, such as subpoenas and discovery orders, are not selfenforcing. 2 6 Thus, a third party who disagrees with an arbitrator's subpoena simply
need not comply with the order. The party to the arbitration proceeding who wants
the nonparty to testify or produce information must then proceed in court to enforce
the arbitral order.287 Alternatively, the third party against whom the arbitral order
has been issued or another party to the arbitration proceeding on behalf of the
nonparty may move to quash the subpoena or arbitral order. Courts normally defer
to arbitrators' determinations, but have also been solicitous of the non-party status
of a person challenging an arbitrator's subpoena or other order. For example, in
Reuters Ltd. v. Dow Jones Telerate, Inc.,288 an arbitrator attempted to subpoena
documents from a third person who was a competitor of the party seeking the
information. The court held that although the arbitrator had authority to subpoena
information from a third person, this subpoena was inappropriate because it required
the nonparty to divulge confidential information that might put it at a competitive
disadvantage in relation to the party seeking it. This is an appropriate approach for
a court reviewing the propriety of an arbitral subpoena or discovery order to an

280. R.U.A.A. § 17(a).
281. Id. § 17(b).
282. Id. § 17(c).
283. See 2000 StyledAct with Comments, supra note 6,at Official Comment 8 to R.U.A.A. § 17.
284. R.U.A.A. § 17(b).
285. Id. § 17(e).
286. Under the UAA and FAA courts have allowed nonparties to challenge the propriety of arbitral
subpoenas or other discovery-related orders. See. e.g., COMSAT, 190 F.3d 269; Integrity Ins., 885 F.
Supp. 69.
287. See R.U.A.A. § 18 (allowing judicial enforcement ofa pre-award ruling by an arbitrator in an
expedited judicial proceeding).
288. 231 A.D.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). See also Group Health Plan, Inc., 30 S.W.3d at 203
(concluding that when parties to prior arbitration entered into an agreement, which was signed by both
parties and arbitration panel, providing that materials related to that arbitration were confidential, such
confidential information was not discoverable in unrelated arbitration).
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outside, third party. The nonparty has not agreed to the arbitration provision nor to
the arbitrator's implicit authority to compel testimony or information. Moreover, by
opting for arbitration parties accept an adjudicative system where discovery
generally is disfavored. Before involving a third person in the arbitration process,
arbitrators and courts should require a party to present sufficient justification for that
person's participation.
Section 17 intends to follow the present, majority approach of courts to
safeguard the rights of third parties while insuring sufficient disclosure of
information to provide for a full and fair arbitration proceeding. This objective is
best met by giving arbitrators discretion to compel testimony or information from
nonparties but cautioning arbitrators against unduly infringing on the rights of
outsiders. This is one area where courts may more closely insure protection of third
persons who challenge the propriety of arbitral orders involving them in the
arbitration process.'"
A new provision in section 17 should assist parties to arbitrations involving
persons in more than one state. Presently, to enforce a subpoena or a discoveryrelated order against a person in another state requires two court actions. For
example, assume an arbitration is held in Missouri and a party would like to depose
a witness in New York who will be unavailable for the hearing. Under present
practice, the party must seek a subpoena from the arbitrator under section 17(a),
request enforcement of that subpoena by a court in Missouri, and then file the
Missouri court order in the appropriate court in New York for enforcement. 29 Under
section 17(g), ifNew York has adopted the RUAA, the party may take the subpoena
from the arbitrator in Missouri directly to the New York court, which may enforce
the subpoena "upon conditions determined by the court in order to make the
arbitration proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective.""29 This RUAA provision
eliminates the need for duplicative court proceedings.
The RUAA resolves the difficult arbitral discovery issues by allowing parties
to adopt their own discovery rules, including the full panoply of procedures allowed
in the judicial process. If the parties do not provide for discovery rules in their
arbitration agreement, then section 17, as a default mechanism, authorizes arbitrators
to decide whether to allow discovery and, if so, to what extent. Normally arbitrators
will allow only limited discovery under the standards of section 17(c). Although
arbitrators have authority to involve third parties in discovery and the arbitral
process, the statute recognizes that, as nonparties, these persons are entitled to
greater protections from unwarranted interference. Section 17(g) makes the means

289. See Heinsz, supra note 116, at 218-19, 221-22 (arguing that courts should enforce subpoenas
of labor arbitrators against third parties unless the person's objection is primarily a legal issue such as
privilege or confidentiality).
290. See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Publ'g Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120,559 F. Supp.
875, 877-78 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that "[u]pon a party's refusal to comply, enforcement of the
subpoena may be had via a petition in the United States District Court for the district in which the
arbitrator sits"); Amgen, 1994 WL 594372, at * 1-*2 (finding that"[s]ince the Arbitrator in the underlying
arbitration is sitting in Chicago, it was incumbent upon Amgen, pursuant to the plain language of Section
7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, to bring its petition to compel compliance in [Illinois]. Instead, Amgen
brought the petition in this court ....In short, Amgen has filed its motion to compel compliance in the
wrong district.").
291. R.U.A.A. § 17(g).
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to compel out-of-state witnesses to attend arbitral discovery proceedings or hearings
more efficient. Section 17 not only adapts discovery to evolving arbitration practice,
but also maintains arbitration's identity separate and apart from litigation.
E. Jurisdiction
Presently, section 17 of the UAA provides that where an arbitration agreement
requires arbitration in a particular state, the agreement confers jurisdiction on the
courts of that state both to enforce the agreement and to enter judgment on an
arbitration award. The Drafting Committee determined to treat jurisdiction to
enforce an arbitration agreement differently from jurisdiction to enter judgment.
Section 26(a) of the RUAA provides that a state court with jurisdiction over an
arbitral dispute and over the parties may enforce an agreement to arbitrate. 292 This
means that a court with personal jurisdiction over those involved in the controversy
and subject-matter jurisdiction concerning the contract may determine whether to
require arbitration. For instance, consider a New York corporation that sells
consumer goods throughout the country on the Internet by a contract that includes
an arbitration agreement; a Missouri resident purchases goods from the New York
corporation. The Drafting Committee was concerned that under the UAA, the New
York corporation could designate that the arbitration clause's validity could be
determined only by a court in New York, making it difficult and expensive for a
resident from Missouri or from other states to challenge the arbitration agreement.
Under section 26(a), a Missouri court could determine the purchaser's challenge to
the arbitration agreement if that court would otherwise have subject-matter and
personal jurisdiction over the New York corporation. This provision intends to
prevent a party, particularly one with superior bargaining power, from requiring the
other party to determine the enforceability of an arbitration agreement only in a
distant forum.
Section 26(b) is similar to UAA section 17, which states that a court in the place
where the agreement requires the matter to be arbitrated has jurisdiction to enter
judgment on the award.2 93 Most courts have interpreted UAA section 17 to mean
that if the parties' agreement designates a place for the arbitration proceeding, that
state has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the arbitrator's award.
The rationale has been to prevent forum-shopping in confirmation proceedings and
to allow party autonomy in the choice of location of the arbitration and subsequent
proceedings to enforce the award.294 Section 26(b) codifies this case law by

292. Id. § 26(a).
293. Id. § 26(b).
294. State ex rel. Tri-County Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
("[E]very state that has considered the question ofjurisdiction to confirm the award has focused on the
place of arbitration and not the locus of the contract ....[T~he place of contracting is not always, or
even frequently, the convenient location for arbitration. Modem business operates in a multi-state
environment, and the parties should be permitted to choose the place of arbitration and confirmation
upon consideration of convenience, and not upon artificial concepts of the place of contracting."). See
also Kearsarge Metallurgical Corp. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1981); General Elec. Co.
v. Star Technologies, Inc. 1996 WL 377028 (Del. Ch. June 13, 1996); Stephanie's v. Ultracashmere
App. Ct. 1981); Tru Green Corp. v. Sampson, 802 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. Ct.
House Ltd., 424 N.E.2d 979 (111.
App. 1991).
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explicitly providing exclusive jurisdiction for the court in the state where the parties
hold the arbitration.295
Section 26 changes the law so that persons may seek enforcement of arbitration
agreements in any state with personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. It also makes
clear that only courts in the jurisdiction where the parties agreed to hold the hearing
may enter judgment on the award. This clarity concerning the appropriate court to
decide the validity of the arbitration agreement and to decide the validity of an
arbitration award should benefit users of the arbitration process.

IV. CONCLUSION

The RUAA Drafting Committee members, the academic advisors, the American
Bar Association liaisons, and the observers were persons very knowledgeable about
arbitration law who brought special insights from their own arbitration and other
legal experience. During the drafting process inevitable differences arose over close
policy issues, precisely because they were close ones over which reasonable persons
with different perspectives and expertise should differ. Nevertheless, all participants
were dedicated to proposing a statute that would enhance arbitration as a disputeresolution mechanism. The result is a product that modernizes arbitration law,
revises and clarifies many issues, and makes the arbitration system more efficient
and fair. In view of this effort, it is not surprising that so many arbitration
organizations and interest groups 296 supported, and NCCUSL unanimously passed,
the RUAA.
The Uniform Law Commissioners' passage of the RUAA was an important
event, but it is only the first step in the more significant process of state enactment
of the proposed law.297 The drafters of the RUAA are hopeful that this act will be
even more successful than the UAA which, in some form, has influenced state
arbitration legislation in forty-nine jurisdictions. 9 " With the interconnectedness of
commercial, employment and individual transactions throughout the United States
and in the international sphere, uniformity is imperative in the law governing
arbitration, a major means of dispute resolution. Forty-five years since the UAA's
enactment is sufficient time to bring this statute in line with modem arbitration
practice in the twenty-first century.

295. After an arbitral dispute arises, the parties may change the jurisdictional requirements of section
26(a) and (b) by agreement. R.U.A.A. § 4(b)(l).
296. The American Arbitration Association; JAMS; the National Academy of Arbitrators; the Dispute
Resolution Section of the American Bar Association ("ABA"); the Labor and Employment Law Section
of the ABA; the Torts and Insurance Practice Section of the ABA; the ABA Real Property, Probate and
Trusts Section; the ABA Senior Lawyers Division; the American College of Real Estate Lawyers; and
the Committee on Arbitration of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York expressly supported
the RUAA.
297. The author is already aware of efforts to introduce the RUAA into thirteen states: Alabama,
Arizona, Calitomia, Connecticut, Illinois, Missouri, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Utah, and Vermont (documents on file with author).
298. See supra Part I.
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In light of the strong doctrine of federal preemption in the field of arbitration
law,2 99 many persons, including those who participated in drafting and passing the
RUAA through NCCUSL, desire that the FAA follow a similar path to that of the
RUAA. If this uniform act not only improves state arbitration law but also serves
as a precursor for modernizing and revising the FAA, it will make an invaluable
contribution to the evolution of arbitral law.

299. See supra Part I.A.
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SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:
(1) "Arbitration organization" means an association, agency, board,
commission, or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors, or administers
an arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator.
(2) "Arbitrator" means an individual appointed to render an award,
alone or with others, in a controversy that is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
(3) "Court" means [a court of competent jurisdiction in this State].
(4) "Knowledge" means actual knowledge.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture,
government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public
corporation; or any other legal or commercial entity.
(6) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form.
SECTION 2. NOTICE.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], a person gives notice to
another person by taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other
person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of
the notice.
(b) A person has notice if the person has knowledge of the notice or has
received notice.
(c) A person receives notice when it comes to the person's attention or
the notice is delivered at the person's place of residence or place of business, or at
another location held out by the person as a place of delivery of such
communications.
SECTION 3. WHEN IACTI APPLIES.
(a) This [Act] governs an agreement to arbitrate made on or after [the
effective date of this [Act]].
(b) This [Act] governs an agreement to arbitrate made before [the
effective date of this [Act]] if all the parties to the agreement or to the arbitration
proceeding so agree in a record.
(c) On or after [a delayed date], this [Act] governs an agreement to
arbitrate whenever made.
SECTION 4. EFFECT OF AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE;
NONWAIVABLE PROVISIONS.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a party to an
agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding may waive or, the parties
may vary the effect of, the requirements of this [Act] to the extent permitted by
law.
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(b) Before a controversy arises that is subject to an agreement to
arbitrate, a party to the agreement may not:
(1) waive or agree to vary the effect of the requirements of Section
5(a), 6(a), 8, 17(a), 17(b), 26, or 28;
(2) agree to restrict unreasonably restrict the right under Section 9 to
notice of the initiation of an arbitration proceeding;
(3) agree to restrict unreasonably restrict the right under Section 12
to disclosure of any facts by a neutral arbitrator; or
(4) waive the right under Section 16 of a party to an agreement to
arbitrate to be represented by a lawyer at any proceeding or hearing under this
[Act], but an employer and a labor organization may waive the right to
representation by a lawyer in a labor arbitration.
(c) A party to an agreement to arbitrate or arbitration proceeding may
not waive, or the parties may not vary the effect of, the requirements of this
section or Section 3(a), (c), 7, 14, 18, 20(c) or (d), 22, 23, 24, 25(a) or (b), 29, 30,
31, or 32.
SECTION 5. [APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL RELIEF.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 28, an [application] for
judicial relief under this [Act] must be made by [motion] to the court and heard in
the manner provided by law or rule of court for making and hearing [motions].
(b) Unless a civil action involving the agreement to arbitrate is pending,
notice of an initial [motion] to the court under this [Act] must be served in the
manner provided by law for the service of a summons in a civil action.
Otherwise, notice of the motion must be given in the manner provided by law or
rule of court for serving [motions] in pending cases.
SECTION 6. VALIDITY OF AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE.
(a) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any
existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in
equity for the revocation of a contract.
(b) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
(c) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to
arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.
(d) If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or
claims that a controversy is not subject to, an agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the
court, unless the court otherwise orders.
SECTION 7. [MOTION] TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION.
(a) On [motion] of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and
alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement:
(1) if the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the
[motion], the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and
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(2) if the refusing party opposes the [motion], the court shall
proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it
finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
(b) On [motion] of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has
been initiated or threatened but that there is no agreement to arbitrate, the court
shall proceed summarily to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate.
(c) If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not
pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) order the parties to arbitrate.
(d) The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim
subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been
established.
(e) If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an
alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a [motion] under this section
must be made in that court. Otherwise a [motion] under this section may be made
in any court as provided in Section 27.
(f) If a party makes a [motion] to the court to order arbitration, the court
on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be
subject to the arbitration until the court renders a final decision under this section.
(g) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any
judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim
subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim.
SECTION 8. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES.
(a) Before an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and able to act,
the court, upon [motion] of a party to an arbitration proceeding and for good
cause shown, may enter an order for provisional remedies to protect the
effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding to the same extent and under the same
conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil action.
(b) After an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and able to act:
(1) the arbitrator may issue such orders for provisional remedies,
including interim awards, as the arbitrator finds necessary to protect the
effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding and to promote the fair and expeditious
resolution of the controversy, to the same extent and under the same conditions as
if the controversy were the subject of a civil action; and
(2) a party to an arbitration proceeding may move the court for a
provisional remedy only if the matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not able to act
timely or the arbitrator cannot provide an adequate remedy.
(c) A party does not waive a right of arbitration by making a [motion]
under subsection (a) or (b).
SECTION 9. INITIATION OF ARBITRATION.
(a) A person initiates an arbitration proceeding by giving notice in a
record to the other parties to the agreement to arbitrate in the'agreed manner
between the parties or, in the absence of agreement, by certified or registered
mail, return receipt requested and obtained, or by service as authorized for the
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commencement of a civil action. The notice must describe the nature of the
controversy and the remedy sought.
(b) Unless a person objects for lack or insufficiency of notice under
Section 15(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing, the person by
appearing at the hearing waives any objection to lack of or insufficiency of
notice.
SECTION 10. CONSOLIDATION OF SEPARATE ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), upon [motion] of a
party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding, the court may
order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the
claims if:
(1) there are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration
proceedings between the same persons or one of them is a party to a separate
agreement to arbitrate or a separate arbitration proceeding with a third person;
(2) the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in
substantial part from the same transaction or series of related transactions;
(3) the existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the
possibility of conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration proceedings; and
(4) prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not
outweighed by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the rights of or hardship to
parties opposing consolidation.
(b) The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration
proceedings as to some claims and allow other claims to be resolved in separate
arbitration proceedings.
(c) The court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an
agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits consolidation.
SECTION 11. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR; SERVICE AS A
NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR.
(a) If the parties to an agreement to arbitrate agree on a method for
appointing an arbitrator, that method must be followed, unless the method fails.
If the parties have not agreed on a method, the agreed method fails, or an
arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and a successor has not been
appointed, the court, on [motion] of a party to the arbitration proceeding, shall
appoint the arbitrator. An arbitrator so appointed has all the powers of an
arbitrator designated in the agreement to arbitrate or appointed pursuant to the
agreed method.
(b) An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial
relationship with a party may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement
to be neutral.
SECTION 12. DISCLOSURE BY ARBITRATOR.
(a) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to
serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all
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parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other
arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to
affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including:
(1) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding; and
(2) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or
representatives, a witness, or another arbitrators.
(b) An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to
the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators
any facts that the arbitrator learns after accepting appointment which a reasonable
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator.
(c) If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by subsection (a) or (b) to be
disclosed and a party timely objects to the appointment or continued service of
the arbitrator based upon the fact disclosed, the objection may be a ground under
Section 23(a)(2) for vacating an award made by the arbitrator.
(d) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by subsection (a)
or (b), upon timely objection by a party, the court under Section 23(a)(2) may
vacate an award.
(e) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose
a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding
or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act
with evident partiality under Section 23(a)(2).
(f) If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of
an arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators
before an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a
condition precedent to a [motion] to vacate an award on that ground under
Section 23(a)(2).
SECTION 13. ACTION BY MAJORITY. If there is more than one
arbitrator, the powers of an arbitrator must be exercised by a majority of the
arbitrators, but all of them shall conduct the hearing under Section 15(c).
SECTION 14. IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATOR; COMPETENCY TO
TESTIFY; ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
(a) An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is
immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State
acting in a judicial capacity.
(b) The immunity afforded by this section supplements any immunity
under other law.
(c) The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by Section
12 does not cause any loss of immunity under this section.
(d) In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or
representative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and may
not be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or
ruling occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent as a judge
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of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity. This subsection does not
apply:
(1) to the extent necessary to determine the claim of an arbitrator,
arbitration organization, or representative of the arbitration organization against a
party to the arbitration proceeding; or
(2) to a hearing on a [motion] to vacate an award under Section
23(a)(1) or (2) if the [movant] establishes prima facie that a ground for vacating
the award exists.
(e) If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration
organization, or representative of an arbitration organization arising from the
services of the arbitrator, organization, or representative or if a person seeks to
compel an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organization to testify or
produce records in violation of subsection (d), and the court decides that the
arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization
is immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or representative of the
organization is not competent to testify, the court shall award to the arbitrator,
organization, or representative reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable
expenses of litigation.
SECTION 15. ARBITRATION PROCESS.
(a) An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the
arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the
proceeding. The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power to
hold conferences with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before the hearing
and, among other matters, determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and
weight of any evidence.
(b) An arbitrator may decide a request for summary disposition of a
claim or particular issue:
(1) if all interested parties agree; or
(2) upon request of one party to the arbitration proceeding if that
party gives notice to all other parties to the proceeding, and the other parties have
a reasonable opportunity to respond.
(c) If an arbitrator orders a hearing, the arbitrator shall set a time and
place and give notice of the hearing not less than five days before the hearing
begins. Unless a party to the arbitration proceeding makes an objection to lack or
insufficiency of notice not later than the beginning of the hearing, the party's
appearance at the hearing waives the objection. Upon request of a party to the
arbitration proceeding and for good cause shown, or upon the arbitrator's own
initiative, the arbitrator may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary
but may not postpone the hearing to a time later than that fixed by the agreement
to arbitrate for making the award unless the parties to the arbitration proceeding
consent to a later date. The arbitrator may hear and decide the controversy upon
the evidence produced although a party who was duly notified of the arbitration
proceeding did not appear. The court, on request, may direct the arbitrator to
conduct the hearing promptly and render a timely decision.
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(d) At a hearing under subsection (c), a party to the arbitration
proceeding has a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the
controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.
(e) If an arbitrator ceases or is unable to act during the arbitration
proceeding, a replacement arbitrator must be appointed in accordance with
Section II to continue the proceeding and to resolve the controversy.
SECTION 16. REPRESENTATION BY LAWYER. A party to an
arbitration proceeding may be represented by a lawyer.
SECTION 17. WITNESSES; SUBPOENAS; DEPOSITIONS;
DISCOVERY.
(a) An arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness
and for the production of records and other evidence at any hearing and may
administer oaths. A subpoena must be served in the manner for service of
subpoenas in a civil action and, upon [motion] to the court by a party to the
arbitration proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced in the manner for enforcement
of subpoenas in a civil action.
(b) In order to make the proceedings fair, expeditious, and cost
effective, upon request of a party to or a witness in an arbitration proceeding, an
arbitrator may permit a deposition of any witness to be taken for use as evidence
at the hearing, including a witness who cannot be subpoenaed for or is unable to
attend a hearing. The arbitrator shall determine the conditions under which the
deposition is taken.
(c) An arbitrator may permit such discovery as the arbitrator decides is
appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the parties to
the arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of
making the proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective.
(d) If an arbitrator permits discovery under subsection (c), the arbitrator
may order a party to the arbitration proceeding to comply with the arbitrator's
discovery-related orders, issue subpoenas for the attendance of a witness and for
the production of records and other evidence at a discovery proceeding, and take
action against a noncomplying party to the extent a court could if the controversy
were the subject of a civil action in this State.
(e) An arbitrator may issue a protective order to prevent the disclosure
of privileged information, confidential information, trade secrets, and other
information protected from disclosure to the extent a court could if the
controversy were the subject of a civil action in this State.
(f) All laws compelling a person under subpoena to testify and all fees
for attending a judicial proceeding, a deposition, or a discovery proceeding as a
witness apply to an arbitration proceeding as if the controversy were the subject
of a civil action in this State.
(g) The court may enforce a subpoena or discovery-related order for the
attendance of a witness within this State and for the production of records and
other evidence issued by an arbitrator in connection with an arbitration
proceeding in another State upon conditions determined by the court so as to
make the arbitration proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective. A subpoena
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or discovery-related order issued by an arbitrator in another State must be served
in the manner provided by law for service of subpoenas in a civil action in this
State and, upon [motion] to the court by a party to the arbitration proceeding or
the arbitrator, enforced in the manner provided by law for enforcement of
subpoenas in a civil action in this State.
SECTION 18. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF PREAWARD
RULING BY ARBITRATOR. If an arbitrator makes a preaward ruling in favor
of a party to the arbitration proceeding, the party may request the arbitrator to
incorporate the ruling into an award under Section 19. A prevailing party may
make a [motion] to the court for an expedited order to confirm the award under
Section 22, in which case the court shall summarily decide the [motion]. The
court shall issue an order to confirm the award unless the court vacates, modifies,
or corrects the award under Section 23 or 24.
SECTION 19. AWARD.
(a) An arbitrator shall make a record of an award. The record must be
signed or otherwise authenticated by any arbitrator who concurs with the award.
The arbitrator or the arbitration organization shall give notice of the award,
including a copy of the award, to each party to the arbitration proceeding.
(b) An award must be made within the time specified by the agreement
to arbitrate or, if not specified therein, within the time ordered by the court. The
court may extend or the parties to the arbitration proceeding may agree in a
record to extend the time. The court or the parties may do so within or after the
time specified or ordered. A party waives any objection that an award was not
timely made unless the party gives notice of the objection to the arbitrator before
receiving notice of the award.
SECTION 20. CHANGE OF AWARD BY ARBITRATOR.
(a) On [motion] to an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding,
the arbitrator may modify or correct an award:
(1) upon a ground stated in Section 24(a)(1) or (3);
(2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award
upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or
(3) to clarify the award.
(b) A [motion] under subsection (a) must be made and notice given to
all parties within 20 days after the movant receives notice of the award.
(c) A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of any
objection to the [motion] within 10 days after receipt of the notice.
(d) If a [motion] to the court is pending under Section 22, 23, or 24, the
court may submit the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or
correct the award:
(1) upon a ground stated in Section 24(a)(1) or (3);
(2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award
upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or
(3) to clarify the award.
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(e) An award modified or corrected pursuant to this section is subject to
Sections 19(a), 22, 23, and 24.
SECTION 21. REMEDIES; FEES AND EXPENSES OF
ARBITRATION PROCEEDING.
(a) An arbitrator may award punitive damages or other exemplary relief
if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim
and the evidence produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal
standards otherwise applicable to the claim.
(b) An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney's fees and other
reasonable expenses of arbitration if such an award is authorized by law in a civil
action involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to the
arbitration proceeding.
(c) As to all remedies other than those authorized by subsections (a) and
(b), an arbitrator may order such remedies as the arbitrator considers just and
appropriate under the circumstances of the arbitration proceeding. The fact that
such a remedy could not or would not be granted by the court is not a ground for
refusing to confirm an award under Section 22 or for vacating an award under
Section 23.
(d) An arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses,
must be paid as provided in the award.
(e) If an arbitrator awards punitive damages or other exemplary relief
under subsection (a), the arbitrator shall specify in the award the basis in fact
justifying and the basis in law authorizing the award and state separately the
amount of the punitive damages or other exemplary relief.
SECTION 22. CONFIRMATION OF AWARD. After a party to an
arbitration proceeding receives notice of an award, the party may make a
[motion] to the court for an order confirming the award at which time the court
shall issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or corrected pursuant
to Section 20 or 24 or is vacated pursuant to Section 23.
SECTION 23. VACATING AWARD.
(a) Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding,
the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means;
(2) there was:
(A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
arbitrator;
(B) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party
to the arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 15, so as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
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(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
(5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person
participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection under
Section 15(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
(6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the
initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 9 so as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
(b) A [motion] under this section must be filed within 90 days after the
[movant] receives notice of the award pursuant to Section 19 or within 90 days
after the [movant] receives notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to
Section 20, unless the [movant] alleges that the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in which case the [motion] must be
made within 90 days after the ground is known or by the exercise of reasonable
care would have been known by the [movant].
(c) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in
subsection (a)(5), it may order a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground
stated in subsection (a)(1) or (2), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If
the award is vacated on a ground stated in subsection (a)(3), (4), or (6), the
rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the award or the arbitrator's
successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing within the
same time as that provided in Section 19(b) for an award.
(d) If the court denies a [motion] to vacate an award, it shall confirm the
award unless a [motion] to modify or correct the award is pending.
SECTION 24. MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD.
(a) Upon [motion] made within 90 days after the [movant] receives
notice of the award pursuant to Section 19 or within 90 days after the [movant]
receives notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to Section 20, the court
shall modify or correct the award if:
(1) there was an evident mathematical miscalculation or an evident
mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property referred to in the award;
(2) the arbitrator has made an award on a claim not submitted to the
arbitrator and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the claims submitted; or
(3) the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the
merits of the decision on the claims submitted.
(b) If a [motion] made under subsection (a) is granted, the court shall
modify or correct and confirm the award as modified or corrected. Otherwise,
unless a motion to vacate is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
(c) A [motion] to modify or correct an award pursuant to this section
may be joined with a [motion] to vacate the award.
SECTION 25. JUDGMENT ON AWARD; ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES.
(a) Upon granting an order confirming, vacating without directing a
rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award, the court shall enter a judgment in
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conformity therewith. The judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as
any other judgment in a civil action.
(b) A court may allow reasonable costs of the [motion] and subsequent
judicial proceedings.
(c) On [application] of a prevailing party to a contested judicial
proceeding under Section 22, 23, or 24, the court may add reasonable attorney's
fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation incurred in a judicial proceeding
after the award is made to a judgment confirming, vacating without directing a
rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award.
SECTION 26. JURISDICTION.
(a) A court of this State having jurisdiction over the controversy and the
parties may enforce an agreement to arbitrate.
(b) An agreement to arbitrate providing for arbitration in this State
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court to enter judgment on an award under
this [Act].
SECTION 27. VENUE. A [motion] pursuant to Section 5 must be made in
the court of the [county] in which the agreement to arbitrate specifies the
arbitration hearing is to be held or, if the hearing has been held, in the court of the
[county] in which it was held. Otherwise, the [motion] may be made in the court
of any [county] in which an adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if
no adverse party has a residence or place of business in this State, in the court of
any [county] in this State. All subsequent [motions] must be made in the court
hearing the initial [motion] unless the court otherwise directs.
SECTION 28. APPEALS.
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) an order denying a [motion] to compel arbitration;
(2) an order granting a [motion] to stay arbitration;
(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) a final judgment entered pursuant to this [Act].
(b) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a
judgment in a civil action.
SECTION 29. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND
CONSTRUCTION. In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration
must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its
subject matter among States that enact it.
SECTION 30. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND
NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. The provisions of this [Act] governing the
legal effect, validity, or enforceability of electronic records or signatures, and of
contracts formed or performed with the use of such records or signatures conform
to the requirements of Section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and
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National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000), and
supersede, modify, and limit the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act.
SECTION 31. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [Act] takes effect on [effective
date].
SECTION 32. REPEAL. Effective on [delayed date should be the same as
that in Section 3(c)], the [Uniform Arbitration Act] is repealed.
SECTION 33. SAVINGS CLAUSE. This [Act] does not affect an action
or proceeding commenced or right accrued before this [Act] takes effect. Subject
to Section 3 of this [Act], an arbitration agreement made before the effective date
of this [Act] is governed by the [Uniform Arbitration Act].
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